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1.0 Introduction 
Conservation work in conflict zones and across international borders has impacts on more than just 
wildlife populations and their habitats; it can also have a profound effect on the peace and conflict 
dynamics in a region. For example, while the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) 
implements activities with the primary objective of conserving mountain gorilla populations and 
habitat, anecdotal evidence suggests that these activities have also improved communication and 
dialogue among different authorities in the region, thereby fostering relationships and cooperation 
that are fundamental to peacebuilding. Conversely, decades of experience have shown that 
conservation interventions can cause tensions and contribute to conflict. This is especially 
portentous in conflict zones, where any external intervention can unintentionally fuel tensions and 
conflict by sending the ‘wrong’ message or entrenching perceived inequities.  
 
As a result, IGCP sought a more detailed and systematic understanding of how their conservation 
and development activities affect peace and conflict dynamics in the Great Lakes region. In order to 
ensure that they do not inadvertently exacerbate the conflict dynamic but instead actively contribute 
to peacebuilding, IGCP contracted the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 
to conduct a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of some of their field operations.  
 
 
 
Regional training for census. Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
  
 Gorillas in the Midst:  Assessing the peace and conflict impacts of 
International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) activities 
5
 
The goals of the project were:  
 
1. To assist IGCP in achieving their conservation goals by integrating conflict sensitivity into their 
activities, ensuring that peacebuilding opportunities are maximized and threats to biodiversity 
conservation are addressed.  
2. To develop knowledge about the relationship between conservation and peace/conflict 
dynamics that will contribute to conservation thinking and practice beyond the central African 
region. 
 
In order to achieve these goals, the following objectives were specified:  
 
a. Analyze how IGCP activities address—both positively and negatively—the root causes of 
conflict in the Virunga/Bwindi region; 
b. Integrate the results of the PCIA analysis into the management and monitoring plans of IGCP 
activities; 
c. Build the capacity of IGCP staff to design, conduct and implement the results of PCIAs; and 
d. Communicate the value of conflict sensitivity in Transboundary Natural Resource Management 
(TBNRM) activities to the broader conservation community. 
 
A combination desk-based and field research were undertaken to conduct the analysis, build 
institutional capacity and identify opportunities for integrating conflict sensitivity into IGCP’s 
programming. The emergent and adaptive research process, which was occasionally disrupted by 
changes in personnel, resulted in three interesting case studies on the links between conservation, 
peace and conflict, as well as lessons on the PCIA methodology itself. These lessons have already 
gone on to inform other similar research projects on conflict-sensitive conservation in the region.  
2.0 Background1 
Conservationists working in the Virunga-Bwindi region are faced with mounting socio-economic 
pressures that not only threaten biodiversity but make their jobs more challenging and potentially 
dangerous. This calls for adaptive and innovative approaches to planning, implementing and 
evaluating conservation interventions so that they minimize risks and address some of the root 
causes of threats to conservation.  
  
                                                 
1 This section is based on the IISD Strategy Paper developed for the project, ‘Conserving the Peace: Integrating 
Conflict-Sensitivity into Conservation Interventions in the Albertine Rift’ (2006).   
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2.1  What do we mean by conflict?  
Conflict is one of the greatest threats to conservation in the region. It is a multi-dimensional social 
phenomenon, indicative of social change and transformation (see Box 1).2 Depending on how 
conflict is diagnosed and managed, it can lead to a range of outcomes, from constructive 
development opportunities to violence and human suffering.  
 
Conflict can be characterized according to:  
 
? Causes: Socio-cultural, economic, 
governance and security issues that 
generate grievances.  
 
? Actors: The individuals and groups 
contributing to, or affected by, conflict. 
 
? Geographic scope: The physical scale and 
spread of the conflict.  
 
? Intensity: The spectrum of conflict 
intensity ranges from violent conflict, 
characterized by ‘open acts of hostility’, to 
non-violent. The latter can include latent 
conflict, where tensions exist but parties 
have not decided to act, or manifest conflict, 
where parties decide to act, but not through the use of violence. 
 
Given the wide range of factors that drive conflict, it is clear that if conflicts are to be adequately 
addressed, their context must be clearly understood.  
 
2.2  Conservation and conflict 
Conservation interventions are affected by, address and sometimes contribute to conflict. 
Conservation interventions are not apolitical, as Wilshusin et al. (2002) point out:  
 
…[T]he conservation community becomes a key player among a host of others 
since it contributes heavily to shifts in power dynamics in rural areas that are 
already highly politicized. This is a result of its relative wealth and influence 
compared to most local actors. In short, conservation practices are not benign. 
They alter the local playing field, sometimes drastically. 
 
                                                 
2 International Alert.  2003.  Resource Pack for Conflict Transformation, London.   
BOX 1: Conflict 
Conflict takes place when two or more parties 
perceive that their interests are incompatible, 
express hostile attitudes, or pursue their 
interests through actions that damage the other 
parties.   
 
When resolved peacefully and non-coercively, 
conflict can be a force for positive social 
change.  It can be a sign of a society adapting to 
changing economic, social and environmental 
realities, and an opportunity for marginalized 
groups to redress injustice.  
 
When conflict is ignored or suppressed, it often 
leads to increased frustration and tension, 
which, left unchecked, might result in violence. 
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Thus, conservation interventions affect more than ecosystems—they have implications for 
economic livelihoods, community and cultural identities, political autonomy and control. In fact, the 
propensity for creating or exacerbating social or political tensions is greatest in areas where people 
rely most directly on access to natural resources for their survival and well-being. Many of these 
areas also happen to be in conflict zones, requiring a more considered approach to working with 
people and institutions for the achievement of specific conservation and development goals. 
 
In the Virunga-Bwindi region, a highly biodiverse and conflict-affected area (see Map), 
conservationists deal with conflicts that fall into two broad categories: a) local conflicts, usually 
characterized as non-violent disputes, that are the direct result of conservation interventions; and b) 
regional armed or violent conflicts that are not the direct result of conservation interventions, but of 
deeper-rooted social, cultural and economic factors. Both are described in further detail below.  
 
2.2.1  Local‐level conflicts resulting from conservation 
Local-level conflicts can occur between communities and conservation actors, as well as 
between/within communities 
themselves. While these conflicts 
rarely turn violent, the perceived 
injustices can lead to tensions and 
disputes that, if inadequately 
addressed, can escalate—even leading 
to violence—and threaten the 
effectiveness and sustainability of 
conservation interventions. 
Conservation interventions in the 
Virunga-Bwindi region can create 
local-level conflicts in three ways:  
 
a) Restricting access to livelihood 
resources: Interventions such as 
the establishment of Protected 
Areas, buffer zones and multiple 
use zones are designed to 
control—and usually reduce—
community access to natural 
resources in order to protect and 
enhance biodiversity in the face of mounting population and development pressures. These 
interventions often result in physical displacement of communities, or restricted access to lands 
and resources. The socio-economic implications are acute, as displaced communities often have 
limited development opportunities and tend to be heavily dependent on natural resources to 
begin with. Without appropriate alternatives or compensation, conservation interventions can 
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represent a loss of assets and income to local communities, which can contribute to social 
disarticulation, loss of identity and increased marginalization.3  
 
Resulting conflicts over restricted resource access tend to take place between local communities 
and conservation actors, but sometimes they can fuel tensions between different communities or 
community members. These conflicts focus on issues such as compensation for expropriated 
land or housing, illegal harvesting or use of restricted resources (e.g., poaching), and provision of 
adequate resource alternatives.  
 
b) Introducing or increasing the costs of conservation: For communities living in park-adjacent 
areas, the close proximity to wildlife can expose them to considerable economic burden and 
personal risk. These costs include crop loss and property damage, physical threats to people 
from wildlife, loss of livestock and disease transmission.  
 
The socio-economic costs of living beside conservation interventions can contribute to tensions 
and confrontations between communities and conservation actors. Efforts at reducing or 
offsetting these costs—such as guarding, physical buffers and income-generating activities—can 
minimize or resolve these conflicts.  
 
c) Unequal benefit-sharing: In an attempt to offset the costs of conservation, some interventions 
involve provisions whereby a portion of conservation-related revenues (park fees, tourism 
permits) is reallocated to surrounding communities for small-scale development projects such as 
health clinics and schools. When these benefits are inequitably distributed—i.e., captured by elite 
groups rather than shared with those in greatest need of the benefits—conflict can arise between 
different community members, as well as between community members and conservation 
actors, who are perceived as reinforcing power asymmetries.  
 
2.2.2  Regional‐level conflicts resulting from deep‐rooted social, cultural and economic 
factors 
At the regional-level, conservationists in the Virunga-Bwindi area must also deal with the immediate 
aftermath and continued risk of violent or armed conflict. Since the early 1990s, the shared borders 
of eastern DRC and western Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have been marked by civil war, 
genocides and mass movements of people across and within borders. Domestic conflicts have 
spilled across frontiers and have drawn the four countries into a recurrent cycle of armed conflict 
and proxy war. These conflicts refer to the complex array of tensions and violence stemming from 
issues such as socio-economic disparity, political representation, identity, citizenship and weak 
governance. Further details on the causes and dynamics of regional conflict situation are discussed in 
Section 4.3.1 below.  
 
Violent conflict remains a concern—and a genuine threat—for conservation in many parts of the 
region. Ongoing armed conflicts between militia groups pose direct threats to personnel and 
resources. Refugees, internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and demobilized troops often turn to the 
                                                 
3 Cernea, M. M. 2005.  ‘Restriction of access’ is displacement: A broader concept and policy.  Forced Migration Review, 
Volume 23: 48-49.   
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unsettled lands and resources of protected areas, intensifying park-people conflicts and even 
sparking new conflicts between surrounding communities as resource competition increases. 
Furthermore, a post-conflict setting or unstable peace can translate into volatile socio-political 
dynamics that raise the stakes of conservation management decisions, such as gazetting.  
 
Examples of the ways in which conservation interventions interact with regional-level conflicts 
include:  
 
a)  Conservation interventions being affected by armed conflict: Ongoing conflict can affect 
the environment in general and protected areas in particular: warring factions can threaten the 
safety of staff or base themselves within protected areas with an ensuing free-for-all for the 
park’s resources, patrolling park boundaries can become hazardous and international funding 
sources can dry up.4  
 
b) Conservation activities contributing to regional tensions: Conservation is not just passively 
influenced by conflict. Because access to or control over natural resources is at the heart of 
many conflicts in the region, interventions that influence the availability of these resources risk 
creating or exacerbating tensions. The examples listed in section 2.2.1 highlight how tensions 
result directly from a conservation project in a local setting. In a regional context, the 
relationship between conservation and conflict can be both direct and indirect: 
 
? Direct: In a region where development needs are high and political relationships are 
characterized by mutual suspicion (and, in some cases, aggression), the management 
decisions regarding natural resources can become highly charged political issues that lead 
to disagreement and conflict between local authorities and between governments. This 
can be the case with transboundary natural resources, particularly those with high 
economic value such as mountain gorillas. Conservation interventions that affect the 
distribution of these resources and revenues can create tensions between the affected 
countries. Alternatively, interventions—such as gazetting—that involve the relocation of 
people and disruption of livelihoods can rekindle long-standing tensions between 
different identity groups.  
 
? Indirect: Because of the volatile context, conservation interventions may also inadvertently 
contribute to regional conflict through their operational procedures. That is, in addition 
to what conservationists do (e.g., monitor gorillas, establish parks), how they do it may 
also lead to the escalation of conflict. For example, compensating park-adjacent 
communities with cash for conservation activities may make them targets of violence or 
aggression by armed groups based in the area. 
 
                                                 
4 See the Biodiversity Support Program’s report, The Trampled Grass: Mitigating the impacts of armed conflict on the environment. 
Washington, D.C., USA.: Biodiversity Support Program.  
http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/publications/africa/139/titlepage.htm  
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2.2.3  Linking local‐level and regional conflicts 
The sections above describe both localized conflicts that result from the implementation of a 
conservation intervention, and conflicts that result when an intervention interacts with a broader set 
of socio-political dynamics to exacerbate existing tensions and grievances. The former signifies a 
direct, causal role of conservation, while the latter implies a more passive, indirect role where the 
risk of conflict is attributed to forces beyond the scope and control of the project.  
 
While not always obvious, the two conservation-conflict categories are related. Both conflict 
scenario types relate to issues such as unequal benefit-sharing and restricted access to livelihood 
resources. This suggests that both categories share some of the same structural causes of conflict, 
such as poverty, intensified competition for natural resources, lack of political participation, weak 
governance, and deepening social divisions (both in terms of identity and rural/urban disparities). 
Figure 1 below attempts to demonstrate this relationship.  
 
 
Photo courtesy of Alec Crawford. 
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Figure 1: Linking local‐ and regional‐level conflicts in the Virunga‐Bwindi region 
 
 
 
2.2.4  Conservation and peacebuilding 
Apart from conservation’s potential contribution to both local and regional conflicts, its potential 
role in regional peacebuilding must not be overlooked. Understanding of this link stems from the 
emerging field of environmental peacemaking. Transboundary protected areas are in some 
circumstances referred to as ‘Peace Parks’ due to their potential to foster trust and cooperation 
between different—sometimes previously opposing—stakeholders for the common purpose of 
managing biodiversity and protecting livelihoods. Such environmental cooperation can go on to 
have positive spin-offs for peace. As Conca and Dableko (2002) explain:  
 
The basis for this [environmental peacemaking] claim lies partly in the general conditions 
understood to facilitate cooperation, partly in the issue characteristics common to many 
environmental problems, and partly in the kinds of social relations that are engendered by 
ecological interdependencies (p. 10). 
 
They go on to describe two ways in which environmental cooperation may occur (p. 10–13):  
 
1. ‘Changing the strategic climate’: Exploiting environmental problems as opportunities in 
conflictual situations. That is, using discussions over environmental issues as a means to create 
minimum levels of trust, cooperation, and transparency between actors, thereby improving the 
 
 
Local 
Conflicts 
 
Regional Conflicts 
Shared structural causes of conflict:
- poverty, economic power inequities 
- poor governance 
- lack of participation 
- deepening social divisions, identity politics  
- access to/control over natural resources 
Regional conservation-conflict scenarios: 
- Geographic scope: Mostly within DRC and 
its shared border with Rwanda and Uganda  
- Actors: Armed groups, communities, 
conservation authorities and NGOs 
- Intensity: From latent to open/violent  
Local conservation-conflict scenarios:
- Geographic scope: Areas around or near 
protected areas 
- Actors: local communities; government 
conservation authorities; conservation NGOs 
- Intensity:  Usually latent/manifest, rarely 
violent 
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‘contractual environment’ in the bargaining process; and  
 
2. ‘Strengthening post-Westphalian governance’: Looking outside of formal, state-sanctioned 
negotiations to broader social dynamics—i.e., using environmental concerns to deepen trans-
societal linkages, strengthen regional identities, and transform state institutions to become more 
open, democratic and accountable.  
 
Transboundary conservation initiatives, such as those supported by IGCP, have the potential to 
promote environmental cooperation along both pathways. For example, the technical cooperation 
needed to establish and manage PAs across borders could serve as an opening to other forms of 
cross-border cooperation, while the opening of borders to allow for animal migrations and 
personnel exchanges may deepen transnational relations (personal and economic) and regional 
identities, thereby lessening the incentives for conflict. Likewise, protected areas can support 
livelihoods, generate tourism and finance some degree of post-conflict reconstruction. Conservation 
may therefore prove to be one of the more viable opportunities for peacebuilding in a post-conflict 
setting such as the Great Lakes region. On a smaller, more localized scale, well planned, conflict-
sensitive conservation interventions can contribute to community peacebuilding.  
 
That is emphatically not to say that conservationists should cast themselves as ‘peacemakers’. 
Conservationists can’t expect to transform a larger inter or intra-state conflict—but they can make 
sure their interventions don’t exacerbate existing tensions. If appropriate they can also design their 
conservation interventions in a way that could help, in a small way, to build community 
reconciliation. No-one would suggest, for example, that a joint school trip of Protestant and 
Catholic school children in Northern Ireland is going to resolve a centuries old and bitter conflict—
but it’s a small step in the right direction.  
 
2.3  Rationale: Why a PCIA of IGCP activities? 
Given these multiple and dynamic links between conservation, conflict, and peace IGCP expressed 
an interest in understanding how its mission, mandate and activities were linked to conflict and 
peacebuilding in the Virunga-Bwindi region.  
 
1. IGCP has established projects in conflict zones—i.e., areas with ongoing or recent histories of 
violent conflict, as well areas where the potential for future conflict (still) exists. 
 
2. Peacebuilding is a stated objective of some of IGCP’s programming, particularly their 
transboundary activities, including the hosting of regular regional meetings to promote dialogue 
and cooperation between and among the protected area managers from the three countries and 
the wider NGO community. However, according to Kenneth Bush (1998), the first step in 
evaluating peacebuilding projects is a “refusal to accept them at their self-described face value.” 
There is a growing need to systematically evaluate them, and identify where gaps exist. 
Moreover, understanding how an intervention contributes to peacebuilding is as instructive as 
understanding how it contributes to conflict. 
 
3. There is documented and/or anecdotal evidence of conservation activities contributing to both 
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peacebuilding and to tension in the region. 
 
Engaging the support of consultants and the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD), IGCP organized a preliminary scoping mission to identify the different types and levels of 
conflict in the region, and how they are linked to the protected areas. Accepting that transboundary 
conservation is a type of conservation intervention, why does their establishment or management 
warrant the use of PCIAs? Apart from the aforementioned protected area-related conflicts that are 
also relevant to transboundary conservation areas, there are two additional reasons that suggest a 
need for conducting PCIAs: 
  
• Many transboundary conservation area are established in conflict-prone areas—an obvious 
point, given their associated peacebuilding objectives, but an important one to emphasize. 
Unlike other conservation interventions and traditional protected areas, transboundary 
conservation areas are, for the most part, being targeted to regions with recent histories of 
conflict. These regions include Southern, Eastern and Central Africa, South and Southeast 
Asia, and Latin America.  
 
• Along the same line as the first point, many transboundary conservation areas are self-
described peacebuilding projects, or at least claim to contribute to peacebuilding. Intuitively, 
this makes sense. Getting previously opposing interests to come to the table to cooperate on 
a mutually important priority—biodiversity conservation and economic development—
could form the basis for building trust and friendly relations. But given some of the violent 
histories between some of these parties, this can be a dangerous assumption to make. Fully 
understanding how an intervention contributes to peacebuilding is as instructive as 
understanding how it contributes to violent conflict; a careful analysis is required.  
 
Given the recent proliferation and enthusiasm for transboundary conservation and the growing 
concern over the relationships between protected areas and conflict, it behooves the conservation 
and development community to follow the lead of the humanitarian community in making sure their 
contributions ‘do no harm.’  
 
 
Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
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3.0 Methodology 
3.1  Overall approach  
The methodology for assessing the peace and conflict impacts of IGCP’s work was an emergent 
process, characterized by a combination of field and desk-based research. The main steps in 
undertaking the analysis were: (i) identifying a methodological and analytical framework; (ii) case 
study selection; (iii) data collection; and (iv) case study analyses, including a refinement of the 
analytical framework.  
 
 
IGCP staff. Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
 
The methodological and analytical framework for the study drew from a number of sources. These 
included the Ken Conca and Geoffrey Dabelko’s ‘environmental peacemaking’ concept,5 Kenneth 
Bush’s ‘Hands-On PCIA’,6 Mary Anderson’s ‘Do No Harm’ framework,7 and the Resource Pack on 
‘Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding.’8 Using 
these frameworks, the research team decided to structure its analysis as follows:  
 
a. Conflict analysis: Understand the peace and conflict context related to IGCP’s  
conservation intervention by analyzing the causes, actors and dynamics associated with 
the conflict. 
b. Intervention analysis: Understand the conservation intervention’s intended and actual 
implementation, looking at aspects such as purpose, scope, location, beneficiaries, 
resources and results. 
                                                 
5 Conca, K. and G. D. Dabelko (eds). (2002), Environmental Peacemaking.  Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press. 
6 Bush, K. 2006. Hands-On PCIA: A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA).   
7 Anderson, M.B. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.   
8 Africa Peace Forum, Center for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum on Early Warning 
and Early Response, International Alert, Saferworld, 2004. Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance 
and peace building: Tools for peace and conflict impact assessment. 
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c. PCIA: Assess how the intervention affected the peace and conflict context according to 
different areas of impact, and different aspects of the peace and conflict context. That is, 
how did the intervention affect, both positively and negatively, the causes, actors and 
dynamics of the conflict in the areas of:  
i. Conflict management capacities: Capacity of individual actors, organizations, 
states to identify and address conflicts non-violently as well as respond to 
peacebuilding opportunities.  
ii. Militarized violence and human security: Patterns and levels of violence 
associated with armed groups, as well as perceptions of security or insecurity.  
iii. Institutional structures and processes: Governance capacities and opportunities 
for participation at different levels in government (from village to national level) 
and in organizations. 
iv. Economic structures and processes: Availability, distribution and management of 
resources for equitable and sustainable economic development, whether at the 
local or national level. 
v. Social empowerment: Establishing and/or maintaining a culture of tolerance, 
inclusiveness, equity, justice, participation and respect among different parties, 
whether they are defined by characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, nationality, 
economic wealth, etc.   
d. Indicators: Start thinking about indicators for monitoring and evaluating peace and 
conflict impacts.  
 
Using this broad 
research framework, 
the research team 
selected three IGCP 
interventions for 
analysis. IGCP 
undertakes activities at 
local, national, and 
regional levels. Much 
of the local activity 
involves addressing 
population pressures 
on gorilla habitat and 
health. This can be 
through measures to 
enhance livelihoods, 
resolve human-gorilla 
conflicts and support 
environmental 
education. At the national level, activities focus on building the capacity of protected areas 
authorities to plan, implement and monitor park management activities. And regional level activities 
focus on coordinating and harmonizing local and national activities so that the Virunga-Bwindi 
ecosystems can be managed in contiguous blocks.  
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The specific IGCP activities that were selected as case studies were:  
 
? The Mgahinga Community Development Organization – Examining how IGCP’s 
involvement with a community-based enterprise around Mgahinga Gorilla National Park 
(MGNP) in Uganda affected local efforts to address tensions around revenue sharing.  
? Nkuringo land purchase and buffer zone – Examining how IGCP’s land purchase to 
establish a buffer zone around Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, and the subsequent 
development of a buffer zone management plan, may have contributed to or resolved park-
people conflicts and other community-based tensions.  
? Transboundary cooperation – Looking at the mechanisms used by IGCP to encourage 
cross-border cooperation and interaction including surveillance, regional meetings and the 
preparation of a trilateral revenue-sharing agreement. 
 
The rationale for selecting these interventions was based on a desire to analyze different types of 
conservation interventions at different scales, as well as on the availability of information. Following 
initial consultations and field observations, Project Leader Charles Besançon recognized the MCDO 
and Nkuringo interventions as having peace and conflict impacts on park-people relations. These 
initiatives also had some associated documentation available for review, as activities had been 
underway for several years. There were fewer local-level activities in the other IGCP countries, and 
most seemed to be at the planning or early implementation stages. While this did not theoretically 
preclude them from inclusion in the study, field support in Uganda appeared to be stronger. 
Regional-level activities were included in the analysis, as IGCP’s work in this area was well-
established and well-recognized by partners and donors.  
 
The case studies represent interventions at different stages of the project or program cycle. Some of 
the interventions have been either completed or abandoned—i.e., the Nukuringo land purchase and 
MCDO initiative, respectively—while transboundary activities are still underway. For the activities 
that have been terminated, the research team approached the analysis like an evaluation, while 
activities still underway were approached as a monitoring exercise.  
3.2  Data collection  
Data were collected through document reviews/analysis and stakeholder consultations, primarily 
during research trips to the region. A series of five research trips were undertaken over the course of 
the project, although a substantial amount of desk-based research also complemented this fieldwork. 
 
To understand the origins, structure, mandate and range of work undertaken by IGCP, existing 
project/program reports, as well as documents and studies from government departments and other 
NGOs, were reviewed. Other sources of information included popular books and media including 
newspapers, magazines and television.  
 
Social science research offers a great deal of useful knowledge for understanding the cultural 
relationships among groups of people in the area, including the Batwaa people and ethnic groups 
such as Tutsi, Hutu, Lendu and Hema. Academic literature in a range of disciplines—including 
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African history/studies, political science, anthropology, economics and geography—was consulted 
to shed light on the unique circumstances that have brought the communities to the Virunga-Bwindi 
region and the issues that challenge sovereignty, identity, power and security in the region. 
 
Consultations were conducted with local community members, park staff, NGO staff, and various 
government actors including representatives from different ministries, security forces and border 
patrols. These consultations were in a variety of formats, including semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews, informal discussions, and participatory workshops.  
 
A summary of the stakeholder consultations that were conducted over the research years is provided 
in Table 1. The number of people consulted under each stakeholder category is listed as 
approximate due to staff turnover and transfers, or location of consultations (e.g., Uganda Wildlife 
Authority [UWA] staff being interviewed in Ruhengeri), which sometimes led to confusion and 
overlaps in categories. Because people who agreed to participate in the consultations did so on the 
assurance of anonymity or at least non-attribution of opinions/observations, names are not 
provided in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Summary of stakeholder consultations  
Stakeholder category Approx # consulted Consultation format
IGCP Staff 
- Headquarters (Nairobi) 
- Rwanda (Kigali, Ruhengeri) 
- Uganda (Kampala, Kabale) 
- DRC (Goma) 
 
6 
7 
3 
5 
Semi-structured interview; informal  
Semi-structured interview; workshop; informal  
Semi-structured interview; workshop; informal  
Semi-structured interview; workshop, informal 
Protected Areas Staff 
- ORTPN (Rwanda) 
• Headquarters 
• Ruhengeri 
- UWA (Uganda) 
• Headquarters  
• Kisoro 
• Buhoma 
• Nkuringo  
- ICCN (DRC) 
• Kinshasa 
• Goma 
 
 
2 
5 
 
1 
2 
5 
3 
 
2 
5 
 
Semi-structured interview; informal 
Semi-structured interview; workshop; informal 
 
Semi-structured interview 
Semi-structured interview; workshop; informal 
Semi-structured interview; workshop; informal 
Semi-structured interview; informal 
 
Semi-structured interview; workshop; informal 
Semi-structured interview; workshop; informal 
NGOs & CBOs 
- WWF (Kenya, DRC) 
- WCS (Uganda, DRC) 
- FZS (DRC) 
- ZSL (DRC) 
- MGVP (Rwanda) 
- CARE (DRC) 
- AICC (Uganda) 
- MCDO (Uganda) 
- NCDF (Uganda) 
- Beekeeper Group (Rwanda) 
- Handicraft Group (Rwanda) 
- Individual community members 
(Rwanda, Uganda, DRC) 
 
3 
5 
2 
3 
1 
2 
8 
4 
12 
3 
2 
12 
Workshop; informal 
Workshop; informal 
Workshop; informal 
Workshop; informal 
Workshop; informal  
Informal 
Semi-structured group interview; informal 
Semi-structured group interview 
Semi-structured group interview 
Informal 
Informal 
Informal 
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Workshops in particular yielded valuable information for this project, as they not only provided 
useful inputs but also offered a forum for developing the capacity of IGCP staff to conduct and 
implement the results of PCIAs and to promote conflict sensitivity. Topics of discussion in all forms 
of consultation revolved around natural resource scarcity and management issues, livelihood issues, 
conflicts between and among communities and protected area authorities and lastly, ethnic issues. 
Consultations were also tailored to specific case studies of interest to the overall study.9 
 
A summary of each of the research trips is provided below.  
 
3.2.1  Trip 1: Initial site description and preliminary analysis (February–March, 2004) 
While this first research trip took place before the start of the Buffett-funded portion of the project, 
it was crucial for defining the scope of work. Project Leader Charles Besançon travelled to the IGCP 
head office in Nairobi and then to each of the country offices in Rwanda, Uganda and DRC. The 
purpose of these visits was to meet with IGCP staff, introduce them to the project, and hold 
preliminary consultations on the links between conservation and conflict. The results of these 
discussions provided a basis for developing the conceptual and methodological framework for the 
project.  
 
3.2.2  Trip 2: PCIA brainstorming workshop (March–April 2005)  
To finalize the research framework and methodology, the Research Team (i.e., Project Leader and 
IISD Technical Advisor, Anne Hammill) undertook a field visit to the Virunga region. The purpose 
of this visit was to hold a regional brainstorming workshop in order to introduce the project and 
solicit feedback on its approach, as well as discuss observed links between conservation and 
peace/conflict in the region. Discussions from this meeting helped the project team members fine-
tune the research framework and methodology. Immediately following this meeting, the project 
team members undertook field research to gather information on some of IGCP’s conservation and 
community development activities. This involved meetings with IGCP staff in Kigali, Ruhengeri and 
Goma, as well as visits to project sites in other parts of the Virunga region.  
 
3.2.3  Trip 3: PCIA field research (September 2005) 
Field research continued when the Project Leader attended the Regional Meeting in Ruhengeri to 
update IGCP and its partners on the project and continue gathering field information. Specifically, at 
the regional meeting the Project Leader received assistance from IGCP staff and the Protected 
Areas authorities in making the final selection of specific case studies to be analyzed in this project. 
They also discussed entry points in IGCP planning for integrating conflict sensitivity as well as 
potential indicators. The Project Leader then visited the IGCP office in Goma, DRC and held 
impromptu meetings with community leaders around Virunga National Park to discuss the peace 
and conflict impacts of gorilla tourism and other conservation activities.  
 
                                                 
9 The locations and depth to which these case studies will be investigated was one of the agenda items at the inaugural 
brainstorming meeting in Ruhengeri for this PCIA in late March 2005. 
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3.2.4  Trip 4: Regional meeting in Goma (December 2005) 
A penultimate research trip was undertaken in conjunction with the Regional Meeting in Goma. 
Participation in the Regional Meeting consisted of spending half a day presenting on the PCIA 
project. Specifically, the Project Team reviewed the purpose, rationale and approach of the project 
and provided an update on the selected case studies. After this, the Research Team conducted a 
brief exercise, soliciting ideas and feedback on potential peace and conflict indicators for 
conservation activities in the Virunga-Bwindi region. Participation in the Regional Meeting also 
provided an opportunity for more informal interactions with IGCP staff and PA authorities, which 
supplemented the results workshop exercise on indicators.  
 
3.2.5  Trip 5: Final PCIA field research (August 2007)  
While Research Trip 4 was intended to be the final field visit to the region, changes to the 
management and structure of the project required an additional trip. Specifically, the departure of 
Project Leader Charles Besançon from the project just after the research trip 4 and prior to 
undertaking the final analysis of the data resulted in some delays and complications. While the 
Technical Advisor, Anne Hammill, had accompanied the Project Leader on some of the Research 
Trips, her role was mostly limited to co-organizing and facilitating the two workshops. Much of the 
firsthand field research had been undertaken by the Project Leader. Upon his departure, it was 
decided that the Technical Advisor would try to use his research notes to undertake the final 
analysis. The field notes were helpful in providing a general context of the case studies, but 
important details were either missing or the context had changed significantly, highlighting the 
difficulties with transferring field research experience. As more time elapsed from the time of the 
Project Leader’s departure, it became too difficult to backfill this missing information. It was 
therefore decided that a fifth and final trip to the region would be undertaken to collect this missing 
information, as well as update the existing data collected earlier in the project.  
 
With some additional resources from IISD, Anne Hammill and IISD Project Officer Alec Crawford 
returned to the region to talk to various IGCP staff and partners on the three selected case studies. 
They travelled to Uganda, where they conducted a series of semi-structured consultations with 
different stakeholder groups—community organizations, individual community members and park 
staff—in both the Mgahinga and Nkuringo areas. These were supplemented by discussions with 
IGCP staff. In DRC, the Project Team met with IGCP and ICCN staff to discuss experiences with 
transboundary collaboration. The trip ended in Rwanda with consultations in Ruhengeri and Kigali, 
where the Team met with IGCP and Office Rwandais Du Tourisme Et Des Parcs Nationaux 
(ORTPN) staff (both in the field and at headquarters) to discuss transboundary collaboration.  
 
3.3  Limitations and challenges  
Before discussing the results of the research, it is important to note the limitations and challenges 
associated with applying the emergent, social science-based methodology described above.  
 
• Use of qualitative, subjective information: The data used to assess the peace and conflict 
impacts of IGCP’s work consisted of peoples’ perceptions and opinions. This reliance on 
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subjective information introduces different problems, as personal biases influenced the basis 
for PCIA analysis. Nonetheless, the research team felt the methodology was appropriate, as 
conflict is a social construct based on perceptions rather than scientific facts. Whether a 
perception is seemingly justified or not, the fact that it exists and is expressed can be 
sufficient to create conditions conducive to peace or conflict. Becoming conflict-sensitive 
means understanding the perceptions that are out there may potentially fuel or resolve 
conflicts, and trying to adjust activities accordingly.  
 
• Data collection and analysis: Moreover, the manner in which stakeholders’ perceptions 
were gathered—largely through semi-structured interviews and informal discussions—did 
not lend themselves to structured analysis, such as coding and discourse analysis. Notes were 
taken by hand, reviewed, and recurring themes pulled out for discussion in the final analysis. 
This approach means that researcher bias has a strong influence on what is ultimately 
discussed and emphasized in the final analysis.  
 
• Researcher bias: It is worth noting the potential biases introduced by the research team in 
gathering and analyzing the information for this work. All members of the research team 
possessed a social science background. The initial Project Leader had a professional 
background in protected areas management, particularly of transboundary protected areas, 
and was interested in how it could contribute to peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas. The 
IISD researchers had backgrounds on the links between environment and human security, 
and were interested in how environmental management could contribute to both peace and 
conflict.  
 
• Personnel turnover: Finally, one of the unexpected but significant challenges faced in 
undertaking the PCIA research was the turnover or change in personnel—both within IGCP 
and the research team. While this is a regular occurrence in any organization, this did lead 
research delays and information gaps.  
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4.0 Results 
Using the results of the five research trips and other desk-based research, the three selected case 
studies were developed and analyzed in terms of IGCP’s observed and potential contributions to 
peace and/or conflict in the Virunga-Bwindi region.  
 
4.1  Case Study 1: Amagyembere Iwacu Community Camp (AICC) for 
Conservation and Better Livelihoods of Neighbours Adjacent to 
Mgahinga Park  
Mgahinga Gorilla National Park (MGNP) is located in Kisoro district, south-west Uganda. It covers 
the northern slope of three Virunga volcanoes, and is contiguous to both Parc National des 
Virungas (Mikeno Sector) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Parc National des 
Volcans in Rwanda. The 33.7 km2 park is part of the transboundary habitat for the critically 
endangered mountain gorillas and home to the rare and endangered golden monkeys. In addition to 
protecting biodiversity, the park provides crucial environmental services to surrounding human 
communities, serving as an important water catchment area and helping to regulate the local climate 
and conserve soil.  
 
MGNP is under threat, however. Immediate threats include clearing and conversion of land for 
agriculture, poaching, firewood collection, charcoal production, cattle grazing and fire. The 
underlying socio-political drivers of these threats include high population density (estimated at 300 
people per square kilometre), limited available land, poverty and restricted livelihood options, lack of 
alternative energy sources, insecurity and displacement.  
 
4.1.1  Background 
Over the last 50 years, Mgahinga Gorilla National Park has been threatened and its forest cover 
reduced. In its early days, it was dually designated a wildlife reserve and a forest reserve, jointly 
managed by the Game Department and the Forest Department, though little active management 
resulted from this arrangement. During the 1950s, local residents began to resent the reserve, as it 
was land they believed they had a right to utilize to sustain their livelihoods.10 As a result of this 
resentment, as well as the growing need for land and limited government authority in the area, local 
people cleared approximately nine square kilometers of land for farming in an area now called Zone 
2.11  
 
In August 1991, Mgahinga was gazetted as a national park and people living in Zone 2 were evicted. 
Those who possessed documentation proving they had been allowed to enter and use the forest 
were financially compensated for their move; those who did not possess such documentation were 
not. Many evictees did not own additional land outside the park and simply returned to the 
                                                 
10 Adams, B. and M. Infield. 1998. Community Conservation at Mgahinga Gorilla National Park, Uganda. University of 
Manchester. African Wildlife Foundation. University of Zimbabwe. University of Cambridge. Report. 
11 Kalpers, José. 2001. Volcanoes under Siege: Impact of a Decade of Armed Conflict in the Virungas. Washington, 
D.C.: Biodiversity Support Program 
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communities from which they originated, located in the three parishes surrounding the park. But 
even those who had plots outside the park faced income contraction and livelihood insecurity as a 
result of the relocation.  
 
With the encouragement of park staff and several NGOs, many of these evicted landholders decided 
to purchase additional lands adjacent to the park entrance in order to benefit from what they saw as 
growing tourism opportunities related to gorilla trekking. A total of 33 evicted families each 
contributed approximately UGX 21,000 to purchase the additional land just outside of MGNP’s 
main gate, located in Gisozi parish. The plan was to establish a community-run tourist facility to 
cater to the expected influx of trekkers. In order to formalize this arrangement, in 1993 the 33 
families established the Amagyembere Iwacu Community Camp (AICC), a registered community-
based organization with an elected executive committee.  
 
During its first 10 years, the AICC managed to generate some revenue. According to AICC 
executives, these revenues were used to expand and upgrade campground facilities, as well as 
support community needs such as infrastructure and school fees. The group had help on both of 
these fronts: donor assistance funded some facility renovations12 while tourists, learning of the 
community support program, started sponsoring schoolchildren. However, business continued to 
rely on a limited customer base of walk-in and word-of-mouth visitors, and two developments cut 
significantly into profits. First, the emergence of war in neighbouring Congo in 1997 reduced the 
amount of overland traffic in the region. Moreover, the Ugandan government prohibited 
overlanders from staying near the park for security reasons and insisted they stay in Kisoro town, 
visiting the park only on day trips. Second, in 2004 the one habituated gorilla group in the park, the 
Nyakagezi group, migrated into neighbouring Rwanda for long stretches of time, taking with them 
the primary tourist draw for the park. While the group had never been completely resident in 
Uganda (it had been habituated in DRC and had regularly moved between the two countries), it had 
been spending enough time in MGNP to create tourism demand and a certain level of economic 
dependency. Further compounding these exogenous events was the poor management of the 
campground, which ultimately led tourists to stay elsewhere.  
 
The campground revenues and benefits that were generated despite these developments remained 
concentrated in one parish, and within that parish mostly among the 33 families involved in AICC. 
These livelihood benefits were by no means lucrative; most AICC executive members continued to 
rely on agriculture as their primary source of income. AICC was therefore keen to continue 
expanding and improving the campground to maximize its market share of the tourism traffic 
through MGNP.  
 
4.1.2  Description of conflict 
AICC started lobbying local and international NGOs for financial support to upgrade its facilities. 
IGCP, who had supported the campground since its inception, was eager to expand the earning 
potential of the campground as well as the number of beneficiaries. Specifically, IGCP wanted to see 
benefits distributed beyond the 33 founding members of AICC to include other people from Gisozi 
                                                 
12 For example, two Peace Corps volunteers helped the group secure funding from USAID to expand its banda 
accommodations.  
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Photo courtesy of Alec Crawford. 
 
 
parish and the other two parishes adjacent to the park (Rukongi and Gitendre). According to IGCP 
staff, the members of AICC agreed to expand coverage of their activities to other parishes in 
exchange for closer collaboration with IGCP, who would help AICC seek additional financial 
resources, including a community-negotiated partnership with a private tourism company. To 
consolidate this expanded effort, the Mgahinga Community Development Organization (MCDO) 
was established in late 2003, a registered company limited by guarantee. The intention was to 
establish a local institution that would coordinate community-based initiatives around the park.    
 
In fact, the establishment of MCDO was 
precipitated by the opportunity to apply for 
funding through the UNDP Small Grants 
Programme. A proposal for US$50,000 was 
prepared to support renovations in the 
campground. Funding was contingent on two 
conditions: a) that the project be renovation-
based rather than ‘starting from scratch’; and 
b) that it contribute to community 
development. IGCP and MCDO needed 
AICC for the former, using the existing 
campground as collateral to access the grant, 
while AICC needed IGCP and MCDO for 
the latter. AICC members were most directly 
involved in developing the proposal. Their 
understanding was that once funding was 
secured and investments were made in 
upgrading the campground, MCDO would 
buy the land from the 33 members of AICC. These members would subsequently relinquish their 
ownership rights, and campground benefits could be shared more broadly. 
 
Meanwhile, park staff and NGOs, including IGCP, went into the three park-adjacent parishes to 
mobilize community support for MCDO, whose management structure consisted of an elected 
executive. Local communities, having heard of the UNDP grant opportunity, enthusiastically 
embraced the idea of becoming members of MCDO, believing that their UGX 1,000 investment 
would buy them a share in the improved campground and generate benefits, such as other 
community projects and money for school fees. A total of UGX 3.4 million was collected from 
community members in the three parishes through MCDO membership fees. 
 
A number of misunderstandings took seed during the process of applying for and negotiating the 
UNDP funding. People who had paid a membership fee to join MCDO believed the campground 
was now communally owned and the UNDP money would yield additional benefits for the park-
adjacent communities, perhaps through small enterprises, infrastructure renovations, etc. AICC, 
however, had a different understanding of the agreement. For them, the grant was strictly for 
campground renovations and not any other community development activities. Moreover, if they 
were not happy with the offer from MCDO-IGCP to purchase the campground, they would simply 
decline the offer and continue to operate the campground as usual, without revenues accruing to 
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MCDO members. The campground would then represent one of many projects operating under the 
MCDO umbrella in the three parishes; they would share experience and advice with the other 
projects, but revenues would largely remain within the 33 founding families. 
 
Crucially, IGCP-MCDO and the AICC had not agreed on the sale price of the campground before 
submitting the UNDP grant proposal. Upon securing the funding, IGCP commissioned a 
professional valuation of the property that led to an offer of UGX 30 million to AICC. However, 
since they had by this point secured the financial means to upgrade their facility, AICC executives 
were no longer beholden to MCDO or to IGCP; they could either receive additional cash from the 
sale, or could operate an improved facility, which might prove to be even more lucrative. AICC 
therefore rejected the IGCP offer and demanded UGX 66 million for the property. Unable to match 
this price through fundraising or the collected MCDO membership contributions, IGCP withdrew 
its offer and backed away from the project, citing AICC’s lack of commitment to community 
development. IGCP explained its position to UNDP, who tried unsuccessfully to mediate between 
the two parties (IGCP/MCDO and AICC), but in the end continued to support the AICC.13 
 
At this point, MCDO members were refunded their membership fees14 and the organization 
effectively folded, holding its last executive meeting in October 2005. However, unbeknownst to the 
executive committee, AICC continued to operate the campground under the MCDO banner: the 
MCDO name is prominently displayed on the campground’s sign, and AICC operates a number of 
projects under the MCDO name, even setting aside some office space for MCDO in the 
campground’s new offices. Thus, while AICC uses the MCDO name, the benefits of the 
campground continue to accrue solely to the group’s 33 founding members. AICC maintains that 
the projects that they are running under the MCDO banner come from all three parishes, yet 
MCDO executive members appeared to be completely unaware of this.  
 
Over this time, the AICC did manage to secure an arrangement with the private tour company Red 
Chilli. While this did increase the campground’s marketing reach for a time, the death of the 
company’s owner in late 2005 forced Red Chilli to withdraw. Without this marketing link, and with 
the migration of the Nyakagezi gorilla group into Rwanda in late 2004, tourism has fallen in the 
region. 
 
4.1.3  Peace and conflict impact of the AICC campground upgrade 
IGCP’s activities around Mgahinga Gorilla National Park were unable to resolve the conflict 
between community members over the potential benefits flowing from the AICC development 
project. While this intervention did attempt to increase and equitably share campground revenues 
among the three park-adjacent parishes, a series of conflicting goals, poor communication and 
misunderstandings led to the intervention’s collapse.  
 
                                                 
13 It is unclear how the AICC accessed the UNDP funds, which were to be deposited in an MCDO account which 
would require signatories from all three parishes for any withdrawals.  
14 Refunding the membership fee money proved a bit problematic, as some funds had been used to meet as a group 
throughout the UNDP grant process.  This deficit was made up for with funds from the grant, thus reducing the 
amount available for campground renovations.  
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The first factor contributing to the conflict was that the two principal negotiating partners in the 
intervention (IGCP and AICC) were not working towards the same goal. Each had its own agenda: 
while IGCP sought to increase and expand benefits to park-adjacent communities, the founding 
members of AICC were concerned—justifiably—with earning a strong return on their initial 
investment. This non-alignment of interests threatened the project when AICC, having used its 
alliance with IGCP and MCDO to secure UNDP funding for campground renovations, rejected 
IGCP’s offer to buy the facility for UGX 30 million, demanding more money. A dispute resolution 
mechanism had not been established for the process, leaving IGCP and MCDO with no recourse to 
confront AICC and reach a compromise. Without this mechanism, and with IGCP withdrawing 
from the project in light of AICC’s evident lack of commitment to broader community development 
goals, MCDO was left without institutional support and effectively stopped operating in October 
2005.  
 
This brings into question the sustainability of the initiative. Although designed to serve as a 
community development organization working across all three parishes, the MCDO did not survive 
in its intended form beyond the collapse of the AICC agreement. One reason for this may have been 
the organization’s management structure; one of the MCDO board members was also a founding 
member of the AICC, creating a conflict of interest between the two parties which allowed AICC to 
benefit from information asymmetries. The institutional integrity of MCDO is brought into further 
question considering the ease with which AICC managed to co-opt the organization for its own 
purposes and operate it without the knowledge of the MCDO executive. This may be a function of 
IGCP/UWA rushing to establish MCDO in time to include it on the UNDP small grants 
application; more time must be taken to ensure these types of community development 
organizations build the capacity to operate independently.  
 
The seemingly rushed nature of the AICC-IGCP-MCDO partnership also led to a significant 
amount of misunderstanding concerning the economics of the agreement. Whereas MCDO 
members believed that their UGX 1,000 membership fee automatically translated into a share of the 
renovated campground’s increased revenues, AICC members believed that they would either sell the 
campground at a profit or continue to operate it as one of several community-based projects under 
the MCDO umbrella. A lack of effective communication, both between partners and among their 
constituents, led to differing expectations that made mutual agreement difficult.  
 
Finally, neglecting to agree on a sale price for the campground before the UNDP funding was 
secured shifted bargaining power to AICC. Without any legal obligation to transfer ownership of the 
campground to MCDO, AICC was in a position to either operate a renovated campground, or ask 
for more cash to maximize their return. Once UNDP funding had been granted, IGCP and the 
MCDO had no leverage with which to negotiate with the AICC. Having a clear idea of expectations 
and negotiating positions, as well as solid plan for managing the entire process—from establishing 
the partnership, to valuing the land, to making an offer—may have averted some of the problems 
among AICC, MCDO and its partners. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the observed peace and conflict impacts of the AICC / MCDO campground 
upgrade. While peace impacts were difficult to observe due to the project’s collapse, lessons can be 
drawn from its failures. First, effective communication is central to empowering community 
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members, strengthening negotiations and avoiding misunderstanding. To achieve this, interventions 
must be carefully planned and must be aware of the negotiating positions and interests of those 
involved. Second, dispute resolution mechanisms and the obligations designed to support them can 
help minimize exploitation, align interests and reduce the chance of conflict. These mechanisms, 
whether statutory or customary, must be identified in the planning process and supported and built 
on during the project.  
 
Table 2: Peace and conflict impacts of the AICC/MCDO campground upgrade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area of impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact
Conflict Management Capacities   * limited capacity to address conflict due 
to the absence of a dispute resolution 
mechanism (MCDO) 
Institutional structures and 
processes 
* increased interaction 
between protected areas 
authorities and 
communities 
 
* conflict of interest with shared board 
member between the AICC and MCDO  
* unsustainable institutional structure, as 
evidenced by MCDO’s collapse and co-
option by AICC  
* tensions between organizations 
(IGCP/UWA and UNDP) 
Economic structures and processes * campground upgraded, 
increasing tourism potential 
* non-alignment of economic goals among 
the three parties  
* manipulation of economic power and 
valuation process rewarded 
* economic benefits not shared, limited to 
a small number of people  
* unclear or unenforced financial 
management protocols, allowing AICC to 
receive funds without recourse  
Social empowerment * initial opportunity for 
community members to 
come together to identify 
shared goals, needs, 
priorities (that would be 
addressed through MCDO)
* frustration and resentment towards 
AICC members 
* feeling of hopelessness among MCDO 
member households as a result of returned 
membership fees, no community 
development activities  
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4.2  Case Study 2: Nkuringo land purchase and buffer zone  
Located in southwest Uganda, Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) sits on the western edge 
of the Rift Valley, across the border from Parc National des Virungas in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The park was first gazetted into a forest reserve in 1932. In 1961 it was made an animal 
sanctuary, before becoming a national park in 1991.  
 
Due to its dramatic altitude variations (between 1,160m and 2,607m), BINP is one of the few areas 
in East Africa where lowland and montane vegetations meet, a varied topography which has 
contributed to the park’s extremely rich biological diversity. Bwindi is the most diverse forest in East 
Africa both for tree species (with more than 163 species/10 endemic) and ferns (with more than 104 
species).15 The park is also home to a great variety of birds, insects and mammals; endemic birds and 
butterflies live among dozens of frog species, chimpanzees and African elephants, to name only a 
few. However, perhaps most notable among the park’s residents are 320 mountain gorillas—nearly 
half of the global population.  
 
4.2.1  Background 
In 1993, BINP management opened two of the park’s gorilla groups to tracking. Mubare and 
Katendegyere groups, each habituated over a period of two years, met with considerable success; 
tourism companies who organized gorilla visits were operating at close to 100 per cent capacity. To 
respond to this demand, UWA decided in early 1995 that a third group should be habituated in the 
park. This decision was supported by the BINP management plan (1995–1999) and the Bwindi 
Tourism Development Plan (1992), both of which indicated that a third gorilla group would be 
considered for habituation upon the opening of the first two groups for tourism. 
 
All plans were suspended in April 1995 by the massacre of four gorillas in the park’s Kyaguliro 
research group. Habituation was not discussed again until mid-1996; by this time, emigration had 
reduced the size of Katendegyere group to four and it had ceased to be a viable tourism group. 
UWA (then-named Uganda National Parks, UNP) and IGCP thus decided that a third Bwindi 
gorilla group would be habituated. The choice of which group to habituate would depend on a 
number of factors, including: park zonation, infrastructure, staffing requirements, ease of access for 
tourists, concerns about crop raiding, the home ranges of other gorilla groups and the potential 
distribution of tourism benefits to neighbouring communities. 
 
Following a lengthy research process, Nkuringo group in the south of the park was selected for 
habituation. Central to this decision was the fact that the group’s home range did not overlap with 
that of Mubare group, which centered around the town of Buhoma on the park’s western edge. 
Nkuringo group’s home range lay contiguous to the two Kisoro parishes of Nteko and Rubuguri. Of 
the two, Rubuguri is the commercial centre, while Nteko—as the natural entry point to the park—
stood to benefit the most from gorilla tourism. With no habituated group on the southwest side of 
the park, many people in the area thought that Nkuringo habituation would finally help local 
communities benefit from BINP. Habituation thus began in July 1997.  
 
                                                 
15 IUCN (1994) ‘World Heritage Nomination – Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (Uganda)’, IUCN 
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Reports indicated that by mid-1999 the group was habituated, but, by that point, the Nkuringo 
gorillas had begun spending a considerable amount of time on a small section of community land 
(approximately 4.2 km2) outside of the park boundary. It was observed that these incursions had 
increased with the habituation process, as the group became less fearful of humans. With the gorillas 
feeding on secondary vegetation in the bordering valley and occasionally destroying crops and 
causing human injury, this presented a challenge to park management; not only would tourism be 
impossible on community land (being both unattractive to tourists and not operated on public 
lands), but the increase in human-gorilla-livestock interactions would in turn increase the risk of 
disease transmission among the three groups.  
 
The delays and problems with opening up the Nkuringo group to tourism generated a considerable 
degree of resentment from the Nteko community; residents had already witnessed the positive 
socio-economic impact of gorilla tourism on the Buhoma community, and were eager to see similar 
results in their region. Recognizing this, park management and IGCP convened in late 1999 to 
discuss the pressing issues surrounding the potential opening of Nkuringo group to tourism. Based 
on these discussions, field staff then prepared a report for UWA senior management, presenting it 
for resolution in January 2000. The report’s recommendations included: exploring the opportunity 
of buying off critical land surrounding the park from willing owners; devising methods of 
encouraging Nkuringo group to stay inside the park; strengthening HUGO (Human-Gorilla Conflict 
Resolution Programme) operations; and organizing the community (with IGCP’s help) to help it 
benefit from the Nkuringo tourist program.  
 
In July 2000, the Nkuringo group was diagnosed with scabies. This disease transmission, which was 
attributed to the group’s continued excursions outside of the park, prompted UWA to suspend 
tourist visits until a solution was found. Initial efforts through HUGO yielded few results; while the 
HUGO volunteer task force could drive the gorillas back into the park, the animals typically 
returned the following day. Therefore in late 2000, IGCP and UWA16 launched a plan to purchase 
the land between the park and the community in the hopes of reducing human-gorilla conflicts; this 
buffer zone purchase and its subsequent management are the central focus of this case. 
 
4.2.2  Description of IGCP intervention 
Lands within Nteko parish were identified as those suffering the most from incursions by gorillas 
and other park animals17; as such, it was here that the proposed buffer zone was to be situated. 
IGCP and UWA field research indicated that in order to successfully reduce human-gorilla conflicts, 
a 12km stretch of land adjacent to the park, at a width of 350m, would be required. While the gorilla 
group had at times ventured 800m from the park’s boundary, its preferred range when outside of the 
park was within 350–500m of the edge of BINP. 
 
The lands within the proposed buffer zone were acidic and not particularly productive, but were 
nonetheless used for agriculture and owned by 274 families spread throughout the two parishes. The 
cultivation of annual crops like sorghum, maize, millet, beans, Irish potatoes and sweet potatoes, 
                                                 
16 This was undertaken under the direction of the ‘Nkuringo Committee’, a group made up of UWA field and 
headquarter staff, IGCP, ITFC and CARE. 
17 Including baboons, monkeys and wild pigs. 
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along with timber cultivation, earned the families enough income to help them meet their domestic 
needs.18  
 
When in October 2000 UWA and IGCP brought the proposed land purchase plan to the affected 
communities, it was found that an overwhelming majority (93.3 per cent) were in favour of selling.19 
IGCP and UWA then spent a year consulting with the 274 land-owning households about the 
proposed land purchase plan. During these consultations, which included the six villages directly 
bordering the park, UWA and IGCP helped prepare beneficiaries for the sale, detailing how the 
money would be transferred and how the proceeds could be invested (i.e., in more land, homes, 
etc.).  
 
With community buy-in, UWA-IGCP then engaged an independent valuation/surveying team to 
demarcate and value the plots of land with the participation of local leaders, land owners and their 
neighbours. Once complete, the coalition offered the owners government rates for the lands, i.e., 
rates significantly higher than local market values. Funds for the purchase were raised by UWA-
IGCP from FFI, WWF and IUCN, among other sources. Once transferred, most sellers used the 
proceeds to buy secondary plots to continue their agricultural activities, along with investments in 
livestock and housing.20 To reduce the chance that large cash transactions would make the sellers 
targets for theft, UWA and IGCP set up bank accounts in the sellers’ names for all transfers 
exceeding UGX 300,000. 
 
In all, 274 households were directly affected by the land purchase. Final payments were transferred 
in September 2003; six months later, sellers needed to be off the land. The process largely went 
smoothly, although some tensions did arise. One respondent to IGCP field research indicated that 
he had been coerced by the community to sell his land for the greater good. In other instances, it 
was unclear how the proceeds should be divided among family members for inherited plots. These 
cases were typically resolved in the local judicial system. The creation of the buffer zone also 
required the purchase of government lands, and some disputes did arise between district and sub-
county levels of government as to how the money should be shared.  
 
4.2.3  Buffer zone management 
Once purchased and vacated, the buffer zone would have to be properly managed to guarantee its 
effectiveness. The 200m of the buffer zone contiguous to the park boundary was to be cleared of 
exotic species and returned to scrub land—this portion was to be managed by UWA. The remaining 
150m zone, which was closest to the villages, was to be jointly managed by UWA and the 
communities, and used for pasture and/or cultivation of crops to which gorillas/baboons/wild pigs 
                                                 
18 Annual incomes differed depending on the quality of the plot; field research by IGCP notes that while one farmer 
earned UGX 70,000 from one acre in the proposed buffer zone, another farmer earned UGX 100,000 from eight acres 
in the same area. 
19 Other plans rejected by the involved parties included a) UWA remitting a certain portion of their tourist receipts to 
the community if community lands were used in the tracking of gorillas, and b) UWA subleasing the land from the 
community.  
20 In some cases, the proceeds from the sale were squandered on celebrations, however the community maintains that 
this was the exception rather than the norm. If the money was squandered, it was more due to the seller’s excitement at 
having a lot of cash than to poor planning and implementation from IGCP and UWA.  
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were averse. By co-managing the buffer zone, decision-making became transparent and 
participatory, helping communities meet some of their own needs while UWA worked to achieve its 
conservation objectives. To facilitate this arrangement, IGCP and UWA encouraged the creation of 
the Nkuringo Community Development Foundation (NCDF), a cross-parish group designed to 
effectively engage with park authorities and to organize the joint management activities of the buffer 
zone.  
 
Created in 2003 during the land purchase process, NCDF is 
run by a seven-member executive and a 27-person board. Each 
of the 23 villages spread throughout the parishes of Nteko and 
Rubuguri is represented on the board and each is assigned one 
vote (four executive members also sit on the board). NCDF, 
together with UWA, hold the land titles for the buffer zone. 
Villagers over the age of 18 from either parish can join NCDF 
for a one-time fee of UGX 1000,21 and members can bring 
projects to the executive for their support. These projects, 
known as inter-community enterprises (ICEs), are managed by 
NCDF (with financial and technical support from IGCP) and 
run in and around the buffer zone; ICEs to date have included 
wheat and Artemisia cultivation, the planting of Mauritius 
thorn to act as a natural barrier to gorilla/animal incursions, 
bee-keeping for honey production, handicrafts for sale to 
tourists, and the planting of pasturelands. IGCP helped 
promote the latter by distributing eight heifers and two bulls to 
 the villages adjacent to the park; benefiting families were chosen on the basis of need, the amount 
of damage park animals has caused their property and their ability to care for the cows. Any calves 
born to these heifers are in turn given to other families in the villages. It is believed that park animals 
will fear crossing the open land used for pasture, creating another natural barrier between them and 
the surrounding community.  
 
Before the ICEs were launched, many area families either could not afford to send their children to 
school, or were compelled to keep them at home to help scare roaming park animals back into 
BINP. It is hoped that by investing ICE profits into a scholarship program that will subsidize school 
fee payments, NCDF and its management of the buffer zone can offer a partial solution to both 
problems. In addition, IGCP has continued to support the HUGO volunteer task force. Should 
gorillas cross into the buffer zone, HUGO members are alerted and come to chase the gorillas back 
into the park. While not financially compensated, HUGO volunteers do receive a certain amount of 
equipment (boots, rain gear, etc.) for their work.  
 
Barrier initiatives such as the planting of pasturelands, non-palatable crops and Mauritius thorn 
remain in their infancy, but gorillas are still crossing the buffer zone. Factors such as the presence of 
exotic palatable crops (wild banana, sweet potato vines) in the buffer zone and beyond, the presence 
of remnant forest patches, a home range close to the park boundary, and the secondary growth of 
                                                 
21 This money contributes to the operating budget of NCDF. Currently, the Foundation has more than 1,000 members. 
Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
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vegetation in previously cleared areas and habitats22 have resulted in Nkuringo group continuing to 
move out of BINP, to the detriment of local communities and the gorillas themselves.23 In addition, 
some community members feared that the regeneration of the UWA portion of the buffer zone 
effectively expanded both the gorillas’ habitat and the park boundary.24 With Nkuringo group still 
spending 50 per cent of its time outside of BINP and HUGO volunteers spending over half of their 
time chasing the gorillas back into the park, it is evident that more needs to be done to manage the 
buffer zone and to reduce human-gorilla conflict.  
 
In March 2007, NCDF and UWA, with the support of IGCP, AWF, the Institute of Tropical Forest 
Conservation (ITFC) and the district, sub-county and parish governments, prepared the Nkuringo 
Buffer Zone Management Plan (2007–2012), the first plan of its kind for the zone since its inception 
in 2003. Designed to consolidate the interventions in the buffer zone in a more focused and 
organized manner, the overarching goal of the plan remains true to that of the initial land purchase, 
namely: “Reducing human-wildlife conflict while protecting the critically endangered mountain 
gorilla and contributing to improved community livelihoods.” To accomplish this goal, NCDF and 
UWA recognize that community involvement is key; as it stands, there is little wider community 
participation in the zone’s management, and awareness of the benefits of the buffer zone remains 
quite low. The plan therefore lays out a framework plan for better including the local community, 
civil society, the private sector and government institutions in the zone’s management.  
 
The Nkuringo community is currently resting many of its economic hopes on the construction of a 
tourist eco-lodge, which started in September 2007. As it stands now, tourists typically stay in Kisoro 
and come to Nkuringo for the day to view the gorillas. The eco-lodge, constructed and run by the 
Uganda Safari Company, will rent land from NCDF and contribute US$30/guest to the community. 
In return, the lodge, through NCDF, will receive a set number of the area’s gorilla permits; NCDF 
has reached an agreement with UWA to purchase up to six gorilla permits per day for the Nkuringo 
group. Community members hope that with the construction of the lodge they will benefit directly 
through new jobs (both in construction and as lodge staff) and expanded markets for local produce, 
milk and handicrafts. In addition to this income, 20 per cent of the BINP park entry fees will feed 
back into the community through the existing revenue sharing program. It is hoped that this 
combined income can be invested into promoting alternative livelihoods in the area. 
 
4.2.4  Peace and conflict impact: Nkuringo land purchase  
Community members in both parishes who sold land to UWA-IGCP for the Nkuringo buffer zone 
had largely positive experiences throughout the process. By voluntarily selling land of low 
productivity to the coalition at higher-than-market government rates, they were able to invest in 
lands away from the gorilla/vermin incursions, reducing both their individual crop losses and the 
need to keep their children out of school to chase off the animals. Conflicts among land sellers were 
minimized by the engagement of an independent valuation/surveying team, which worked in 
                                                 
22 NCDF, UWA & IGCP (2007) ‘Nkuringo Buffer Zone Management Plan (2007-2012)’, March. 
23 Fecal samples analyzed in 2005 and 2006 indicate that disease transmission continues to be a problem in the area, and 
that Nkuringo group had the greatest percentage of samples with parasites.  Source: NCDF, UWA & IGCP (2007) 
‘Nkuringo Buffer Zone Management Plan (2007–2012)’, March 
24 NCDF, UWA & IGCP (2007) ‘Nkuringo Buffer Zone Management Plan (2007–2012)’, March 
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conjunction with local leaders, land owners and neighbours to properly demarcate property 
boundaries; in the event of a dispute, the local judicial system was relied upon for resolution. A 
lengthy consultation and sensitization process, including the provision of bank accounts for the 
sellers, helped ease the transition from private to communal ownership and gave sellers the time and 
support to pursue responsible investments, which most did. Finally, the land transfer changed the 
Nkuringo human-gorilla conflict from being a household problem to being one addressed by both 
the community and the parks authority, strengthening both the ability to respond and the 
conservation goals of the region. While there were some reports of coercion to sell, land speculation 
to exploit information asymmetries and disagreements on revenue sharing, the process was largely a 
smooth one. And although it has not yet stopped gorilla incursions onto community lands, it is 
hoped that the buffer zone management plan will address these.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the observed peace and conflict impacts of the IGCP-brokered Nkuringo land 
purchase. Central to the intervention’s success was its planning process: consultations with the 
community were lengthy and carefully thought out, beginning at the proposal stage and continuing 
beyond the ownership transfer as residents participated in the buffer zone management plan. 
Additionally, the benefits flowing out of the agreement were seen as equitable and even generous: 
offers for the land were higher than the market prices, residents would still be able to work the land 
they had sold, and the goal remained a mutually-beneficial reduction in human-animal conflicts. 
Finally, efforts were made to reduce the chance of conflict by valuing and demarcating land in a 
transparent way, through community agreements guided by an independent valuation team. Should 
conflict arise, residents were assured the support of a local judiciary to resolve their disputes in an 
objective way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
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Table 3: Peace and conflict impacts of Nkuringo land purchase  
 
Area of Impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact 
Conflict management capacities * forum for addressing human-
gorilla conflicts in a coordinated 
manner, from 
individual/household level to 
community-level 
* effective use of local judicial 
system for conflict resolution 
among community members 
* community consensus built 
through independent land 
valuation/surveying  
* ability to manage a sensitive 
process from private to communal 
land ownership  
* expectations raised yet unable to 
completely stop human-gorilla 
conflicts,, undermining confidence 
on HUGO and other measures to 
address the problem 
Militarized violence and human 
security 
N/A N/A
Institutional structures and 
processes 
* improved relations between 
protected area authorities and 
community through sale of land 
and plans for buffer zone  
* disagreements over revenue 
sharing of state-owned lands 
between different levels of 
government  
* tensions between government 
authorities and NGO partners, as 
the former perceive the latter as 
usurping local power 
*some tensions between protected 
area authorities and community 
members who spent their profits 
from the land purchase and found 
themselves without additional 
income OR land 
Economic structures and processes * local livelihoods improved 
through the sale of land using 
government rates  
* increased capacity to save and 
manage money through the 
establishment of bank accounts 
* enhanced protection of gorillas, 
increasing tourism potential of 
Nkuringo group 
* some speculative land purchases, 
allowing wealth to be concentrated 
within the community 
* some mismanagement of money, 
leaving several households without 
net profits or land  
Social empowerment * increased community 
participation in conservation 
activities 
* increased community awareness 
of conservation benefits  
* danger of community coercion to 
sell land ‘for the greater good’ 
 
 
  
 Gorillas in the Midst:  Assessing the peace and conflict impacts of 
International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) activities 
34
 
4.2.5  Peace and conflict impact: Buffer zone management 
Despite the establishment of the buffer zone, the Nkuringo gorilla group continues to spend a large 
portion of its time outside of the park, either in the buffer zone or on community lands. This is in 
part due to the fact that buffer zone activities designed to contain the animals have not yet matured: 
the Mauritius thorn barrier is currently maturing and the management team and community 
continue to experiment with non-palatable crops. However despite these challenges, since its 
inception, NCDF has had a positive impact on conflict avoidance in the region.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, NCDF, with its elected executive, broad membership base and low entry 
requirements, facilitates widespread engagement for community members with the protected area 
authority on the management of the buffer zone. NCDF’s joint management of the zone with UWA 
and the district government increases the transparency and accountability in park management. By 
recognizing the mutual benefits of cooperation rather than competition, the Foundation has also 
brought Rubuguri and Nteko parishes together to work for a common goal. Additionally, the 
collaborative arrangements established around the buffer zone between UWA and NCDF will soon 
begin to accrue economic benefits to the surrounding community; an agreement has been reached 
whereby NCDF is guaranteed six gorilla permits per day in addition to 20 per cent of park entry 
fees, to be invested in the community. By allowing NCDF to use these permits to align itself with a 
private tourism operator (the Uganda Safari Company), it is hoped that any community resentment 
for the park will dissipate as it begins to benefit from the tourism receipts. Finally, human-gorilla 
conflicts are directly addressed through a number of initiatives, such as NCDF’s continued support 
for HUGO; the distribution of heifers and the establishment of pasturelands; and the 
implementation of ICEs designed to keep the gorillas within the park boundaries (through the 
cultivation of non-palatable crops). Because of their support for NCDF, by extension these are all 
IGCP-supported activities.  
 
Consultations with stakeholders did, however, expose some of the weaknesses present in the current 
management of the buffer zone. Perceived delays in the arrival of economic benefits from gorilla 
tourism continued to create frustration and resentment towards BINP and UWA, although the 
imminent construction of an eco-lodge in Nteko parish had begun to silence some of these 
complaints. In fact many community members were seen to be relying too much on the expected 
benefits of the eco-lodge; it was commonly presented as a solution to all of the area’s economic 
problems. This overdependence on a narrow, unproven revenue stream could stall efforts to 
diversify livelihoods in the region, and could be problematic should Nteko be faced with a migrating 
gorilla group similar to that of Nyakagezi group in Mgahinga Gorilla National Park. In addition, 
tourism is an unstable income source given the history of insecurity in the region; should conflict 
break out in the area, tourist numbers will fall, so it is better for communities not to rely completely 
on these revenues. Some community members are also concerned with the vegetation regeneration 
in UWA’s sub-zone of the buffer area. Unable to influence this sub-zone’s management, they see the 
regeneration as an expansion of both the gorilla’s habitat and the park boundary; more must be done 
to effectively (and transparently) manage this ecosystem.  
 
While the management plan was only formalized in 2007, its precedent in the creation of NCDF in 
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2003 established its strongest peace impact: a participatory approach to managing the local park 
boundary wherein the community is fully integrated into the planning, execution and benefit-sharing 
of conservation interventions. By creating a forum (i.e., the elected officials of NCDF) through 
which area residents can engage with the parks authority, the intervention increases trust between 
the two groups and strengthens the community’s hand in negotiations on the economic benefits of 
the park (NCDF negotiating for the community the agreement on gorilla permits, for example). Not 
all impacts of the management plan are positive, of course; as in many situations involving the 
distribution of conservation benefits, some groups may lose out.  
 
Table 4. Peace and conflict impacts of NCDF’s buffer zone management plan 
 
Area of Impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact 
Conflict management capacities * participatory forum for 
discussion and negotiation 
established  
* forum for discussing problem 
solving options, including alternate 
or complementary strategies to 
HUGO  
 
* potential management clashes 
surrounding the 200m sub-zone at 
the park’s edge (solely owned and 
managed by UWA) 
* secondary vegetation 
regeneration in the buffer zone 
and the perceived expansion of 
gorilla habitat 
Militarize violence and human 
security 
N/A N/A
Institutional structures and 
processes 
 
* increased transparency in how 
UWA manages the park through 
NCDF collaboration 
* opportunity for the district 
government to actively engage 
with UWA and communities in the 
buffer zone management plan 
* increased cooperation across 
parishes 
* widespread engagement with 
parks authority due to NCDF’s 
broad membership base and few 
entry requirements  
* 1 village, 1 vote Board system 
ensures representation across 
parishes 
* potential resentment created 
through uncertain benefit-sharing 
among parishes  
* potential resentment between the 
community and the parks authority 
due to perceived unequal work-
sharing in the buffer zone 
Economic structures and processes * opportunity to earn revenue 
from tourism due to UWA-NCDF 
agreement on gorilla permits  
* collaboration with the private 
sector, including them in the 
buffer zone management strategy 
(i.e., Uganda Safari Company) 
* opportunity to diversify 
livelihoods and reduce human-
gorilla conflicts through heifer 
distribution scheme  
* opportunity to communally 
* resentment and impatience from 
perceived delays in the arrival of 
economic benefits from tourism 
* continued lack of compensation 
for damaged crops 
* potential dependence on the 
expected future benefits of eco-
lodge 
* impatience surrounding the 
uncertainty of which crop to use in 
the buffer zone, conflicts continue 
* the six permits offered to NCDF 
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Area of Impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact 
accrue and distribute economic 
benefits from ICEs in the buffer 
zone while reducing human-gorilla 
conflicts 
 
created tensions and conflicts 
between NCDF and the Kisoro 
District local government, with the 
latter claiming to represent broader 
community issues. The District 
claims that the permits to NCDF 
hampered competition and would 
lead to more benefits going to the 
Uganda Safari Company 
* communities demanding a share 
of the revenue from tracking when 
done on their fields, creating 
conflict between UWA and NCDF 
individuals 
 
Social empowerment  * increased community 
participation in buffer zone 
management through the elected 
NCDF executive 
* Concentration of HUGO 
activities and location of Eco 
Lodge in Nteko parish leading to 
feelings of resentment among 
community members in Rubuguri 
parish  
 
4.3  Case Study 3: Transboundary collaboration  
Since its establishment in 1991, IGCP has supported a regional approach to achieving its goal of 
mountain gorilla conservation. While largely motivated by an integrated, ecosystem-level 
understanding of the threats and opportunities related to gorilla conservation, this approach has also 
attracted a lot of attention and financial support for IGCP. The profile and appeal of transboundary 
conservation has grown in recent years, and much of the focus has been on transboundary protected 
areas, particularly so-called ‘peace parks.’25 In fact, the Virunga Volcano region is commonly cited as 
a prime candidate for peace park status. Yet IGCP has always understood regional conservation as a 
process along a continuum, which ranges from the absence of transboundary collaboration at one 
end to the formal designation of a transboundary protected area at the other (see Figure 2 below). 
IGCP’s regional or transboundary conservation activities fall into the middle of this continuum, and 
include ecological monitoring and surveillance; tourism development; joint training, communication 
and sharing of experiences; planning; community initiatives; and management planning. 
 
  
                                                 
25 IUCN defines a peace park as an area where there is a clear biodiversity objective, peace objective and where 
cooperation between at least two countries or jurisdictions is a characteristic. 
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Figure 2: Continuum of transboundary collaboration  
 
 
4.3.1  Description of conflict context for IGCP’s transboundary work 
Unlike the previous two case studies, where the peace and conflict impacts of a particular 
conservation intervention were localized and more or less directly linked to the establishment or 
management of the intervention itself, understanding the impacts of IGCP’s transboundary 
collaboration work requires an understanding of conflicts at different scales and among different 
types of actors, particularly at the national and regional level. The previous case studies required a 
detailed understanding of the local community context, while analysis of IGCP’s transboundary 
work requires a broader understanding of the regional conflict among the Great Lakes countries, 
and some of the conflicts within and among institutions involved in park management in the region.  
 
A) Regional conflict among and within Great Lakes countries 
 
Conflict among and within the Great Lakes countries (i.e., Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania, and 
Uganda) has defined much of the region’s post-colonial history, particularly since 1990. Without 
entering into a detailed discussion of the complex evolution—and devolution—of conflict in the 
region, it is worthwhile to summarize a few key issues and events. The region has traditionally been 
inhabited by different groups, including hunter-gatherers, cultivators and pastoralists. Group 
divisions were not established along racial or ethnic lines, but more along political and economic 
relationships. During the colonial period, however, these divisions became ethnicized or racialized 
and used as a basis for both direct and indirect rule. The ensuing polarization of ethnic Hutu and 
Tutsi identities led to a series of violent clashes (mostly in Rwanda) between these groups that 
resulted in significant refugee movements to neighbouring countries in the second half of the 20th 
century. Questions around citizenship and national identity, which were already being asked 
following the resettlement of tens of thousands of people of Rwandan origin (‘Rwandaphones’) in 
eastern DRC for work during the pre-colonial and colonial eras, were compounded. Combined with 
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the establishment of influential ethnic diasporas in the region, a climate of tension and insecurity 
prevailed. 
 
As violence against Tutsis continued from the late 1950s to the 1970s, Uganda was gripped by 
political chaos and economic crisis under the Obote and Amin regimes. The emergence of Yoweri 
Museveni as President and new state-builder in the mid-1980s reinforced national identities but also 
precipitated conflicts in the northern and eastern parts of the country, which eventually spilled 
across international borders. The 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a 
Tutsi-dominated militia group based in Uganda, set the stage for perhaps the most dramatic chapter 
of the regional conflict. Fighting between the RPF and Rwandan army continued on and off until 
June 1994, when Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated. His death triggered a 
100-day genocide where up to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed. As the RPF took 
control of Kigali in July 1994, over two million Rwandans, mostly genocide perpetrators, Hutu 
civilians, and members of the defeated army, fled to neighbouring Burundi, DRC, Uganda and 
Tanzania. Over one million of these refugees settled in eastern DRC alone, many living in refugee 
camps and forming military and political groupings intent on recapturing control of Rwanda.  
The presence of Hutu extremists in these camps resulted in the camps being used as bases for 
incursions against Rwanda, now under Tutsi control, as well as against Congolese Tutsis. Because of 
this persistent threat, and President Mobutu’s lack of response to (or latent support of) this 
continued violence, in October 1996, Rwandan troops launched an invasion of DRC (then Zaire) 
with an armed coalition led by Laurent-Desire Kabila known as the Alliance des Forces 
Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Supported by both Rwanda and 
Uganda, the AFDL’s goal was to oust Mobutu and, after seven months of warfare, Kabila marched 
into Kinshasa and declared himself president of the newly-renamed country, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).  
Shortly thereafter, relations with Rwanda and Uganda deteriorated and the two countries turned on 
Kabila, launching a second war in DRC that officially lasted until 2002. Both countries backed the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democracie, RCD), an anti-
Kabila rebel group formed in Goma, but eventually the two allies fell out and Uganda went on to 
sponsor its own rebel movement, the Congo Liberation Movement (Mouvement de Liberation du 
Congo, MLC), as well as breakaway factions of RCD. In addition to the continued military security 
threats from Hutu armed groups based in the east, territorial aspirations and resource control fuelled 
this war. The country ended up being split into three main sections, with government forces 
occupying the southern tier of the country, MLC controlling a swathe of the north, and RCD and 
the Rwandans controlling much of the eastern and central part of the country. Troops from Angola, 
Burundi, Zimbabwe and Namibia were drawn in to support government forces, bringing the 
number of countries fighting in this second Congolese War to seven.   
Following president Laurent Kabila’s assassination in January 2001, his son, Joseph Kabila, was 
sworn in to replace him. After a number of failed attempts at dialogue and negotiations, a formal 
peace agreement was signed in late 2002. A transitional power-sharing government was installed in 
2003, a new constitution adopted in late 2005, and democratic elections held in November 2006, 
formally consolidating Kabila’s power. Fighting in the eastern part of the country continues to this 
day, however, as the presence of Hutu militias along the Rwandan border persists, drawing in 
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different armed groups and warlords based in the region.  
In many ways, the conflicts in the Great Lakes region have dual characteristics. They are both 
local/national and regional, latent and violent.26 Conflicts at the local level have frequently fuelled 
and been fuelled by regional conflicts, and the direct violence often portrayed in international policy 
and media outlets belies the structural violence that has led to massive human suffering and loss. 
The sources of conflict have been historic but dynamic, and often mutually-reinforcing. As indicated 
above, they include:  
 
a) Legacies of colonialism: French, Belgian, German and British interests characterize the 
colonial history in the region. Arbitrary political borders, the construction and/or manipulation 
of ethnic identities, predatory governance regimes, weak institutions and destructive socio-
economic policies resulted from colonial rule. These directly contributed to the intensification of 
social divisions and tensions and the absence of a nation-building process, leading to (especially 
in DRC) the state being a source of insecurity rather than a provider of security.27 The post-
colonial era has been witness to a great deal of social upheaval, and external interventions in 
economic and political affairs continue, particularly in DRC. Current regional and extra-regional 
actors include many African, Asian, North American and European countries with interests in 
diamonds, coltan, oil and other rich mineral resources.  
 
b) Polarization of identities: With the exception of the Batwa people, who are considered to be a 
significantly different ethnic group, ethnic issues in the region are exceedingly complex. Hutus 
and Tutsi identities, which were by many accounts entrenched by colonial rulers seeking political 
control, have in reality become blurred by centuries of intermarriage. Yet ethnic clashes have 
plagued the region, leading to population displacements and complex relationships among ethnic 
diasporas and minority groups across the borders of Rwanda, Uganda and DRC. Identities—
whether they are ethnic, racial, national, etc.—are often a rallying point for conflicts, mobilizing 
groups to take up arms and defend their interests.  
 
c) Poverty and underdevelopment: Both a cause and symptom of the other root causes of 
conflicts, chronic poverty and underdevelopment continues to characterize much of the 
Virunga-Bwindi region. This is not to discount the very small, elite part of the population that 
enjoys a disproportionate amount of resources and services. Part of the poverty and 
underdevelopment problem is economic disparity, which seems to grow at the expense of a 
rapidly expanding poor population. Resource scarcity is also a major contributing factor as this 
population expands while land availability stays the same. Such conditions can become a basis 
for creation and escalation of grievances, especially where they are perceived to be the result of 
government apathy, unaccountability or discrimination, and the existence of these conditions 
constitute a threat to local livelihoods and cultural identities.  
 
                                                 
26 Ewald, J., A. Nilsson, A. Narman, and P. Stalgren, (2004).  A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region.  Sida 
(Department for Africa).   
27 Ibid.  
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Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
d) Poorly defined, conflicting and weakly-enforced resource rights regimes: Finally, and 
perhaps more directly linked to many natural resource-related conflict issues at all scales, are 
tensions among different resource rights regimes. National policies impose a certain set of 
standards and regulations dictating access and use of resources—such as land, forests, and 
water—which may be in direct opposition to customary or informal resource rights that have 
governed local livelihoods for generations. Protected areas are often associated with statutory 
(i.e., government) resource rights policies, as the state seeks ways of protecting and controlling 
the use of natural resources. Yet in 
countries crippled by weak governance 
and the absence of social services, 
adhering to or enforcing these policies 
is challenging. In some cases, 
government authorities violate 
statutory policies for their own 
personal gains (i.e., ‘protectors become 
destroyers’), opening resource-rich 
areas to exploitation by both local and 
international actors.  
 
B) Institutional conflicts 
 
Understanding the peace and conflict 
impacts of IGCP’s work also calls for a 
look at conflicts among and within 
conservation institutions in the region—
i.e., ICCN in DRC, UWA in Uganda and 
ORTPN in Rwanda. After all, they are the 
principal actors in transboundary 
collaboration, and any strains in their 
capacity or willingness to communicate, 
negotiate, and cooperate will ultimately 
undermine regional collaboration, perhaps 
creating new conflicts.  
 
Conflicts among the different protected 
areas authorities are in some ways a microcosm of the politics in the region. Ugandan and Rwandan 
park authorities are emerging from a period of restructuring, where capacities have been increased to 
better manage parks and the tourism industry. While problems persist, the protected areas 
authorities are overall better supported and integrated into the national governance framework. 
ICCN in DRC, on the other hand, continues to struggle with an absolute lack of resources (physical, 
financial, and technical). Because of the country’s recent (and in some areas, ongoing) history of 
violence and state collapse, the government is unable to support its protected areas authority. ICCN 
has in many ways become wholly reliant on external support (from bilateral and multilateral donors, 
NGOs) to maintain function.  
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This situation has translated into discernable differences in support and capacity among the three 
protected area authorities in the region. These differences can be in terms of salaries and equipment, 
technical knowledge of conservation issues, work ethics, as well as levels of corruption. In some 
cases, this has led to frustration and tensions among the park authorities, as some may be perceived 
as not ‘pulling their weight’ in regional collaboration, or alternatively, unrealistic in terms of 
expectations and results.  
 
Also, conflicts within each of the institutions can have implications for transboundary collaboration. 
Whether they are conflicts at senior management levels, between headquarter and park authorities or 
among personnel at the different park stations, these conflicts can demoralize conservation efforts 
within and among countries.  
 
4.3.2  IGCP’s transboundary work 
Within this multi-layered and shifting context of conflict and peacebuilding, IGCP has been 
undertaking a number of activities to support and enhance collaboration among conservation actors 
in the three Virunga-Bwindi countries. The last remaining habitat of the mountain gorillas are 
divided into two forested blocks: the Virunga volcanoes straddling eastern DRC, northwestern 
Rwanda and southwestern Uganda, and Bwindi Impenetrable forest 30 km north in Uganda 
(adjacent to Sarambwe reserve in eastern DRC). Each forest block is surrounded—and limited—by 
densely populated human settlements. While gorilla habitat expansion is not possible, human 
settlement expansion into gorilla habitat is a real threat. The survival of the mountain gorilla 
therefore depends on maintaining the integrity of the remaining forest, which itself calls for a 
coordinated, ecosystem-approach to forest management.  
 
 
Ministers’ meeting. Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
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Recognizing this need for regional collaboration and coordination, IGCP has been working to 
strengthen the capacity of each of the protected areas authorities to effectively manage the forested 
parks as a regional ecosystem. Referring back to the continuum described at the start of this section, 
IGCP strives to push transboundary collaboration towards the right hand side—i.e., the formal 
designation of a transboundary protected area—but recognizes that much can and needs to be done 
before realizing this goal. Drawing from the idea of a continuum or a gradual approach to 
transboundary collaboration that builds on itself, IGCP has articulated a phased approach to 
developing a regional strategy for collaboration in the Virunga-Bwindi region: 
 
? Phase I: Field-based coordination and collaboration, where the focus is the 
development of informal mechanisms of collaboration that allow for regular communication 
and interaction between wardens and staff of the different protected areas. Information 
sharing, as well as joint planning, surveillance and implementation of other conservation 
activities would contribute to the harmonization and coordination of management 
approaches.  
 
? Phase II: Formalization of regional collaboration, that ensures the principles driving 
field-based coordination and collaboration are institutionalized and not solely dependent on 
individual relationships. While decades of conservation experience in the region has 
demonstrated that improved management is mostly a function of field-based collaboration 
rather than official agreements (i.e., formally designated protected areas are not always 
effectively protected on the ground), formalizing field-based collaboration by defining a 
structure and set of principles for this work, as well as identifying mutually agreed upon set 
of activities that can be allocated resources, will help ensure the sustainability of the 
collaboration. 
 
? Phase III: Formal designation of a transboundary protected area, probably culminating 
in the signing of a formal agreement among the three national governments for the 
establishment of a transboundary protected area. Such an agreement would be backed by 
legislative support as well as well defined political structures and modes of operation for 
regional collaboration.  
 
Until 2001, the bulk of IGCP’s regional work fell within the contours of Phase I type mechanisms 
for collaboration. But in October 2001, IGCP’s foray into Phase II activities was solidified with the 
signing of a tripartite declaration expressing the intention to create a transfrontier protected area. In 
January 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed, committing the three protected 
areas authorities to developing a transboundary strategic plan. This was followed by the October 
2005 ministerial declaration on The Transboundary Natural Resource Management of the 
Transfrontier Protected Area Network of the Central Albertine Rift, which recognizes the eight 
national parks in the Central Albertine rift as a single transboundary ecosystem shared among 
Rwanda, Uganda and DRC, and pledges support for its effective, collaborative management. And in 
May 2006, a trilateral MOU on monitoring and benefit-sharing on transboundary gorilla tourism 
groups was signed, and the Transfrontier Strategic Plan (TSP) adopted.  
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Three elements of IGCP’s transboundary collaboration program were selected for analysis in this 
study, two of which fall under Phase I-type approaches and the third under Phase II. These were:  
 
a) Surveillance (Phase I): Consisting of regular joint surveillance and anti-poaching patrols, this 
activity has been a pillar of IGCP’s regional approach. Typically, park staff from two adjacent 
parks will meet up at an agreed-upon time and location along the border and undertake a joint 
patrol of defined area to monitor threats to the park, including poaching and other illegal 
activities. IGCP’s role is to provide support in coordinating and undertaking these patrols—i.e., 
help park authorities be in touch with each other beforehand, provide rations and equipment to 
patrol rangers, analyze information collected from the surveillance and avail them to park 
authorities, etc. These patrols can last several days and represent one of the riskier 
transboundary conservation activities, as insecurity still plagues the border regions of the 
Bwindi-Virunga complex. Because of this inherent risk, military personnel have become 
involved in the patrols, both to offer protection to rangers but also use the patrols as an 
opportunity to conduct military surveillance.  
 
b) Regional meetings (Phase I): Organized by IGCP every three months, these meetings involve 
representatives from the three protected area authorities, local and international NGOs active in 
the region, researchers and other relevant consultants working on conserving the Virunga-
Bwindi complex. The main purpose of the meetings is to share information and coordinate park 
management, but each meeting also has a different theme (e.g., gorilla health, enterprise 
development, tourism, etc.), allowing for joint learning and training opportunities. These 
meetings are usually preceded by regional Wardens Coordination Committee meetings, where 
only the wardens from the Virunga-Bwindi parks meet to discuss joint park management and 
security issues.  
 
c) Trilateral revenue sharing agreement (Phase II): In May 2006, the heads of the protected 
areas authorities in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
on the ‘Collaborative monitoring of and sharing revenues from transfrontier tourism gorilla 
groups.’ The MOU reiterates the continued commitment to regional collaboration on the 
monitoring of gorilla groups and spells out a revenue-sharing arrangement among the three 
countries. Specifically, it is states that for those gorilla groups that have been habituated in one 
country but have subsequently migrated to a neighbouring country, where they are being used 
for tourism, the fees from gorilla tracking permits will be shared equally between the ‘origin 
institution’ (i.e., the protected area authority in the country where the group was habituated) and 
the ‘host institution’ (i.e., the protected area authority in the country to which the group has 
migrated). The MOU goes on to specify mechanisms for implementing and managing this 
arrangement.  
 
The selection of these three activities offers a nice cross-section of IGCP’s transboundary program. 
The coordinated patrols represent a very practical, field-based activity with tangible results. The 
regional meetings highlight a higher-level form of collaboration that involves field-level actors but 
also includes more political players. And finally the trilateral agreement represents the culmination of 
a political process, facilitated by IGCP, of formalizing regional collaboration.  
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4.3.3  Peace and conflict impacts of IGCPs transboundary work 
Looking again at the analytical framework for this study, each of the selected transboundary 
activities demonstrated both peace and conflict impacts. The peace impacts were mostly associated 
with the fostering of communication and cooperation at different levels, which provide a basis for 
trust-building and construction of shared identities around conservation issues. The conflict impacts 
were related to the potential for inadvertently emphasizing politically sensitive differences among 
groups, trade-offs between peacebuilding at different levels or between conservation and 
peace/conflict interests, and perceived inequities.  These are discussed in greater detail below.  
 
a) Surveillance: The conservation actors interviewed for this study all agreed that joint or mixed 
patrols were useful and effective, particularly for catching poachers, and should be continued as 
part of the regional approach to gorilla conservation. Some felt that the combined personnel and 
experience in these patrols resulted in better conservation outcomes, as larger sections of the 
landscape could be surveyed and more data collected. A few mentioned appreciating the 
opportunity to track gorilla groups that once resided in their park but migrated across the 
border. Others felt that the real value in these patrols lay in the relationships established through 
the pursuit of common interests and goals. Some stakeholders noted that having a shared 
mission and an opportunity to eat, live and work together, even if only for a few days, provided 
enough of a distraction from prevailing political dynamics to allow for a minimum level of 
cooperation and trust-building to take place.  
 
There were, however, problems with these mixed patrols. In spite of being provided with the 
same rations for and basic equipment to undertake surveillance activities, mixed patrolling 
sometimes emphasized institutional differences in resources and capacities, creating feelings of 
frustration and in some cases resentment among rangers from different protected areas 
authorities. More importantly perhaps were the legal and political questions around the safety, 
security and neutrality of conservation actors. Legislation does not allow armed individuals or 
groups, including park rangers, to cross international borders, unless with prior special 
dispensation. Moreover, given the volatile political context in the region and the presence of 
different armed groups in the parks, joint DRC-Rwandan paramilitary patrols, for example, 
which were sometimes accompanied by official military personnel, put rangers in difficult (even 
compromising) situations.  
 
In response to these legal restrictions and the escalating climate of insecurity in the region, 
protected areas authorities and their NGO partners replaced mixed patrols with coordinated 
patrols. Rangers from two countries would meet at an identified location along the shared 
boundary and agree upon a patrol plan, which would keep them on their respective sides of the 
forest. They would plan to meet up a few days later at another location along the border to 
exchange information. The entire patrol would then take place along the border areas of the 
shared ecosystem, but would not involve any rangers crossing international borders (to the 
extent possible, as some stakeholders noted that international boundaries are not clearly 
demarcated in the forest, which could also allow for some flexibility). While these coordinated 
patrols may have assuaged some of the legal and security concerns associated with mixed patrols, 
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it has come at a cost. Many of the rangers interviewed felt that unless these patrols were very 
well coordinated, where rangers on either side of the border were in constant communication, 
they did not produce useful conservation results. Unfortunately, cross-border communication is 
often hampered by incompatible radio frequencies, meaning rangers must use mobile phones, 
which depend on reliable network reception and cost much more to operate. Some stakeholders 
also noted that they would meet up with a ranger group from a neighbouring country for a few 
minutes at the beginning of a patrol, go off and conduct their activities, and never see the other 
rangers again, not knowing if they had fulfilled their part of the surveillance plan. Finally, having 
fewer opportunities for direct interaction and sharing of experiences has decreased levels of 
‘constructive dependency’ and trust-building that can foster cooperation and peacebuilding 
among groups.  
 
Thus, in some ways, by replacing mixed patrols with coordinated patrols, some of the 
peacebuilding mechanisms at the field-level have been sacrificed in favour of peacebuilding 
considerations at a higher, state-sanctioned level. This is understandable and we do not suggest 
that the broader legal or security concerns should be ignored and mixed patrols maintained. But 
understanding the peacebuilding costs of an intervention—or adjusted intervention, in this 
case—might highlight the need to compensate for these costs. For example, by recognizing that 
valuable peacebuilding opportunities have been lost by suspending mixed patrols, can these 
opportunities be created in other areas of IGCP’s work program?  
 
Finally, in addition to considering the peace/conflict impacts of adjusting the modalities of 
transboundary surveillance patrols, one must also look at the limitations of this activity. Some 
stakeholders noted that as useful and constructive as mixed or coordinated patrols can be, their 
potential effectiveness—both in terms of conservation and peacebuilding—may never be 
realized due to differences in institutional capacities (among ICCN, ORTPN and UWA), 
incompatible or conflicting national policies (on conservation law enforcement, for example), 
and regional politics (especially national and ethnic affiliations). While coordinated patrols have 
taken place between DRC and Ugandan rangers, as well as between Ugandan and Rwandan 
rangers, interviewees noted that a DRC-Rwanda patrol had not taken place in over a year. Both 
sides claimed to have submitted requests for a patrol, which were subsequently ignored or 
dismissed. This was attributed to the ongoing insecurity and political sensitivities between 
Rwandan and Congolese governments, including the protected area authorities at the field level. 
IGCP and other conservation organizations in the region are trying to address these limitations, 
particularly the institutional capacity deficiencies and the need for policy harmonization. Perhaps 
recognizing and emphasizing their direct links of these activities to peacebuilding in the region 
will encourage conservation actors to dedicate more resources to this type of work.  
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Table 5 summarizes the observed peace and conflict impacts of the transboundary patrols—
Mixed Patrols (MP) and Coordinated Patrols (CP)—supported by IGCP.  
 
Table 5: Peace and conflict impacts of mixed and coordinated patrols  
 
Area of Impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact 
Conflict management 
capacities 
* opportunity for communication, 
dialogue, sharing of experiences, (MP) 
* opportunity to jointly identify, 
define and address problems 
* establishment of personal relations 
that can form the basis for informal 
and formal networks of cooperation 
(MP mostly) 
* introducing flexibility and 
compromise by trying to safeguard 
the spirit of transboundary 
collaboration while respecting legal 
and political sensitivities (CP)  
* reduced opportunities for 
communication, dialogue, sharing of 
experiences (CP) 
* potentially weaker networks of 
cooperation (CP) 
Militarized violence and 
human security 
* informal and formal networks of 
communication and collaboration 
provide a basis for sharing security 
information and support, enhancing 
protection of park rangers (MP, CP) 
* perceived compromised neutrality 
by collaborating with rangers from 
other countries or military personnel 
(MP) 
Institutional structures and 
processes 
* accumulation of cooperative field 
experiences and data to facilitate 
collaboration at higher political levels 
(MP, CP)  
* enhanced capacity of protected areas 
authorities to organize and conduct 
patrols, increasing the success of 
transboundary collaboration (MP, CP)
* regular dialogue among protected 
areas authorities, providing a basis for 
harmonizing relevant policies and 
modes of operation (MP, CP) 
* dialogue among protected areas 
authorities and military, as well as civil 
society (MP, CP) 
* perceived disregard of legal and 
political frameworks dictating cross-
border movements (MP) 
* inability to conduct patrols a 
reminder of political sensitivities and 
dynamics that fuel conflict (MP, CP) 
* patrols a reminder of differences in 
capacity and resources among 
protected areas authorities (e.g., ICCN 
weaker, under-resourced compared to 
UWA), which can create feelings of 
jealousy and frustration (MP mostly) 
 
 
Economic structures and 
processes 
* direct: patrol rangers provided with 
rations and equipment to assist them 
with their livelihoods (MP, CP)  
* indirect: monitoring of illegal 
activities in parks may provide basis 
for sanctions, weakening war 
economies (MP, CP) 
* indirect: improved surveillance of 
gorillas and their habitat can protect 
and increase the tourism potential in 
the region (MP, CP) 
* rations and equipment may make 
rangers targets for attacks by armed 
groups, particularly in DRC (MP, CP)
* perceived differences in capacity and 
resources among PA authorities may 
be (either legitimately or unjustifiably) 
attributed to preferential treatment by 
NGOs and donors, fuelling 
resentment (MP, CP) 
Social empowerment 
 
* creation and/or reinforcement of 
shared conservation-related identities, 
rather than identities defined by 
* incidents of poor coordination and 
inequitable patrol performance may 
create and/or reinforce negative 
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Area of Impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact 
gender, ethnicity, nationality, etc. at 
field implementation level (MP, CP) 
* opportunity to foster a spirit of 
professional respect (MP, CP) 
* planning and implementation of 
patrols a demonstration of 
participation, inclusion (MP, CP) 
feelings / stereotypes about the other 
group (MP, CP) 
 
 
b) Regional meetings: Despite operating in a volatile environment, regional meetings allow actors 
from different sides to come together to identify and discuss matters of mutual interest. Issues 
related to security and conflict inevitably creep into many of these discussions, since parks 
continue to be held hostage to patterns of violence and political discord in the region. But 
holding these discussions under the rubric of gorilla conservation provides a buffer against 
interactions that might otherwise deteriorate into politicized and polarized debates, undermining 
both conservation and peacebuilding efforts. As mentioned with the transboundary surveillance 
activities above, these meetings allow actors to identify, define and address problems using their 
shared identity as conservationists. That is, their participation in the meeting is defined by what 
they do rather than where they come from, which political parties they support, and other labels 
that often divide individuals and groups in the region.  
 
The stakeholders interviewed 
for this study all agreed that 
the regional meetings are not 
only instrumental to 
establishing a basis for 
transboundary collaboration, 
but that they enhance 
conservation activities and 
professional capacities on all 
sides of the border. This has 
fostered a joint feeling of 
progress and collaboration, 
where successes can be shared 
and challenges tackled 
together. Interviewees often 
cited the importance of 
exchanging conservation 
ideas—e.g., on revenue sharing, 
law enforcement, human-
wildlife conflicts—with peers 
from neighbouring countries. As the Virunga-Bwindi countries have recently emerged (or are 
trying to emerge) from periods of protracted violence and state failure, conservation policies 
tend to be weak, outdated or poorly enforced. Thus, sharing experiences and lessons with 
countries that share not only an ecosystem but similar socio-political contexts can be very 
helpful. Understanding UWA’s experience in implementing its national revenue-sharing scheme, 
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for example, was seen as influencing the development of Rwanda’s own revenue-sharing scheme 
(although the two appear to be very different).  
 
The regular timing of these meetings allows relationship to be established, and a ‘constructive 
dependency’ among individuals, organizations and political authorities to develop. As personal 
relationships grow and people become more familiar with each other, participants can start to 
feel more comfortable discussing some of the political causes and implications of conservation-
related problems, such as corruption, lack of leadership, weak state institutions, etc. This is not 
always the case, however, and the level of openness is often influenced by the prevailing political 
climate at the time of the meeting. Regular contact among groups at these meetings can also 
form the basis for bilateral discussions, which may be more appropriate when negotiating some 
aspects of regional collaboration.  
 
The inclusion of other relevant conservation actors in the region in these regional meetings, such 
as local and international NGOs enhances information exchange and the overall spirit of 
regional cooperation. Moreover, their participation can help to diffuse tensions among 
nationally-affiliated actors (i.e., representatives from the three protected area authorities), since 
they represent non-national entities and their agendas are overtly less political.  
 
Thus, as summarized in Table 6, the greatest contribution of these meetings to peacebuilding is 
the simple, yet crucial, provision of a forum in which to identify problems and develop 
solutions. None of the stakeholders consulted for this study could identify major conflict 
impacts associated with regional meetings—if there were any negative comments, they mostly 
related to the limitations and challenges of holding these meetings. Some interviewees reiterated 
the earlier point about regional politics impeding progress towards transboundary collaboration. 
The climate of intolerance, distrust and aggression that has often characterized relations among 
the Virunga-Bwindi countries can ultimately undermine or set back efforts to meet, 
communicate and jointly implement conservation activities. Even when meetings are possible, 
politically-sensitive conservation issues (such as the presence of foreign armed groups in the 
park) cannot be discussed, augmenting feelings of frustration and distrust among participants. 
While this may not be fair, given the somewhat limited mandate of these regional meetings and 
IGCP’s restricted role and capacity in addressing less conservation-focused issues (i.e., IGCP is 
not in a position to tackle the threatening presence of foreign armed groups in parks), this 
feeling of frustration points to several things: a) that conservation issues do have links to broader 
regional politics, therefore addressing conservation threats may in some cases require navigating 
tricky political waters that are outside the traditional conservation comfort zone; b) these 
politically-sensitive conservation issues may need to be discussed or tackled in other forums 
IGCP should not facilitate but should contribute to; and c) ultimately, some regional meeting 
participants want a forum to discuss these more politically-sensitive conservation issues. Other 
observed frustrations included the periodic delay of regional meetings (often due to security 
concerns or logistical constraints), which, in a more positive light, can be interpreted as an 
indication of the perceived importance of these meetings.  
  
 Gorillas in the Midst:  Assessing the peace and conflict impacts of 
International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) activities 
49
 
 
Table 6: Peace and conflict impacts of IGCP’s regional meetings  
 
Area of Impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact 
Conflict management 
capacities 
* establishment of a forum to discuss 
mutual interests and concerns, resolve 
problems 
* development of personal and 
professional relationships that form 
the basis of informal and formal 
networks of collaboration 
* exchange of experiences and ideas 
for addressing conservation-related 
conflicts  
* formal training in conflict analysis 
and management skills  
* inability to discuss politically-
sensitive conservation issues raises 
doubts about the value of regional 
meetings in managing or resolving 
conflicts.  
Militarized violence and 
human security 
* improved understanding of regional 
security situation and dynamics 
* development of networks of 
collaboration offering support and 
protection, particularly for field staff 
during times of insecurity 
* exchange of experiences and ideas 
for dealing with militarized violence 
/armed groups in parks 
Institutional structures and 
processes 
 
* increased communication among 
national authorities (i.e., park staff) 
* participation and communication 
with/among local authorities 
(customary chiefs)  
* forum for crafting regional/joint 
responses to emerging priorities and 
crises in conservation, which may lead 
to more state-sanctioned collaboration 
* opportunity for indirectly or 
informally discussing politically-
sensitive issues such as corruption, 
weak institutions, etc. 
* rotating location of meeting in three 
countries, encouraging official cross-
border travel and signaling a truly 
regional approach  
* enhanced dialogue and coordination 
among conservation organizations, 
providing a basis for improved and 
more transparent management 
decisions 
* perceived role of IGCP as neutral 
arbitrator / facilitator enhances 
positive perceptions and role of 
conservation NGOs as partners in the 
region 
* non-participation at meetings 
construed as a political statement 
* role of IGCP as arbitrator / 
facilitator of regional meetings 
perceived as political, even 
opportunistic, undermining its 
perceived neutrality and the spirit of 
openness and cooperation  
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Area of Impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact 
Economic structures and 
processes 
* information sharing on illegal 
resource use in parks, encouraging 
coordinated monitoring and 
management to address it at a regional 
level 
* training and information sharing on 
local enterprise development and 
other livelihood diversification 
mechanisms, which addresses some of 
the economic drivers of park-related 
conflicts 
* discussion of tourism activities, 
providing a platform for mutual 
learning and potential coordination of 
regional-level tourism initiatives 
* 
Social empowerment 
 
* enhanced understanding of other 
groups’ challenges, hopes, fears 
through frequent and regular 
interactions  
* constructive interactions based on 
shared, relatively apolitical, 
conservation-based identities 
* diffusion of national identity-based 
tensions through the inclusion of 
international NGOs, civil society 
* cross-border travel, which can 
enhance peoples’ appreciation of 
different contexts as well as socio-
cultural similarities  
* poorly coordinated and/or 
moderated meetings can create or 
reinforce negative perceptions of 
other parties 
* difficulties in discussing politically-
sensitive conservation matters 
reinforce feelings of frustration and 
distrust among groups 
 
c) Trilateral revenue-sharing agreement: The signing of the MOU in May 2006 was hailed as an 
important milestone in regional collaboration. Moving beyond political declarations, it was a 
tangible step towards transboundary management of natural and financial resources. The move 
was important not only in terms of its political signal, which recognized shared roles in resource 
stewardship and economic interdependence of the three countries, but diffused some of the 
mounting tensions over gorilla tourism. In recent years, many of the tourism gorilla groups have 
moved across to Rwanda. For neighbouring countries who had invested time and resources in 
habituating and monitoring these groups, seeing Rwanda reap the profits of their work was 
perceived as unfair. Due to the politically sensitive climate characterized by rumors and mutual 
distrust, this led allegations of Rwanda taking deliberate measures to keep tourism gorilla groups 
on their side of the border. The MOU therefore was a statement of cooperation, sharing and 
good faith in managing this important resource. 
 
The MOU may pave the way for future collaboration over conservation and/or tourism 
activities, since gorillas are not the only resource shared among the countries. This may create 
additional economic opportunities, injecting some much needed investment and prosperity into 
the region. The greater Virunga ecosystem is recognized as having a lot of potential for other 
tourism activities—particularly adventure tourism However, the current security situation makes 
it difficult to promote a broader Virunga tourism experience, although discussions and planning 
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is already underway. The trilateral revenue-sharing scheme may also offer a unique and profitable 
basis for promoting tourism in the region. For a region widely known for its recent (and 
ongoing) struggles against conflict and violence, highlighting the contribution of tourism and 
natural resource management to transboundary cooperation and sharing may be appealing to 
potential tourists.  
 
There are also a number of potential (or existing) problems. First, while there is a discrete 
dispute resolution article in the MOU, it is somewhat vague, instructing signatories to settle 
disputes through existing mechanisms (e.g., Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Great Lakes Peace 
Agreement, etc.). This may be entirely appropriate, but given the somewhat unique nature of the 
MOU, a discrete dispute resolution body designed to address conflicts over regional gorilla 
tourism revenue sharing and management may be a more efficient way of minimizing delays and 
frustrations. Also, while developed in response to tensions over perceived inequities in gorilla 
revenue distribution, the MOU has generated some new reservations. Interviewees in each of 
the countries suggested that the MOU might encourage protected areas authorities to encourage 
tourist to visit gorilla groups habituated on their own country to maximize profits. Related to 
these doubts are the transparency and accuracy of financial records—how can countries be sure 
that they are receiving what they are owed? The MOU stipulates that protected areas authorities 
in the country of origin (i.e., where the transfrontier gorilla group was habituated) must be 
notified each time a ‘shared’ gorilla group is to be visited in the host country (i.e., country to 
which the gorilla group has migrated). This way, they know how much revenue to expect, and 
the tourism activity can be verified through different means of communication and field visits. 
But weak institutions and management capacities, along with continued corruption, cannot 
guarantee this takes place. Superimposed over a prevailing climate of mutual suspicion or 
distrust among the three countries, even the most trivial doubts can escalate into serious 
allegations. Yet allegations and rumors are almost inevitable in the Virunga-Bwindi region. 
Measures to communicate intentions and expectations clearly and inclusively must be taken to 
minimize the spread of misinformation.  
 
The management of revenues after they are shared among the three countries is another point of 
concern in transboundary revenue-sharing. The MOU makes explicit mention of the respect for 
national laws and does not dictate the management of revenues once they are received by a 
national institution. However, the revenue-sharing arrangement has exacerbated some tensions 
among national authorities and within national institutions over revenue management. For 
example, some interviewees alleged that the revenues collected by a representative from one of 
the three protected areas authorities have never reached the institution, or were distributed to a 
select few for personal gain. This has created tensions with the other protected area authorities. 
Others have noted that even if revenues are institutionalized, they tend to stay at head offices in 
the capital cities and very little, if any, of the money goes back to the gorilla parks. Again, this 
has led to tensions, as wardens and staff at the gorilla parks feel they are not adequately 
compensated or supported in their efforts to protect and manage one of the region’s most 
profitable tourism resources. While these tensions over revenue sharing and management are a 
direct result of institutional weaknesses rather than the MOU per se, the implementation of the 
MOU may risk exacerbating these weaknesses if some additional forms of accountability and 
reporting measures are not considered and eventually incorporated. And while the negotiation 
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and implementation of the MOU is 
ultimately left to national authorities 
and out of IGCP’s purview, IGCP’s 
recognized and valued role in 
facilitating trilateral discussions may be 
an (admittedly modest) opportunity to 
contribute to peacebuilding.  
 
Thus, many conservation actors have 
recognized the MOU as a positive 
contribution to cooperation and 
peacebuildling in the Virunga-Bwindi 
region. However, by tying this 
cooperation to the distribution of economic  
resources, the stakes have been raised. Any signs or suspicions of preferential treatment (of 
domestically habituated tourism gorilla groups), false or inaccurate permit reporting, or revenue 
mismanagement threaten to impede or reverse advances in trust-building. As a result, the 
process of managing the MOU must be done carefully, using mechanisms that ensure 
transparency, accountability and sustainability in bank transfers, financial reporting and dispute 
resolution.  
 
 
Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
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Table 7: Peace and conflict impacts of the IGCP‐facilitated MOU on trilateral revenue‐sharing 
 
Area of Impact Peace Impact Conflict Impact 
Conflict management 
capacities 
* dispute resolution article included in 
MOU, providing at least a basis for 
addressing potential conflicts  
 
* the generic dispute resolution 
provisions in MOU may be 
inadequate to address the specific 
needs of the trilateral agreement 
Militarized violence and 
human security 
N/A N/A
Institutional structures and 
processes 
* political symbol of tangible regional 
collaboration 
* political acknowledgement of 
positive achievements in 
transboundary collaboration at lower 
political (field) levels 
* legal basis for regular interaction 
among government institutions (i.e., 
PA authorities) 
* demonstration of commitment to 
transboundary conservation action, 
thus building trust with other 
conservation organizations (NGO 
partners)  
* intra-institutional tensions, as 
revenues are received by institutional 
HQ in capital cities and not always 
shared with provinces/districts/park 
sectors that host the gorillas. 
* mismanagement of revenues by 
signatory creating tensions with other 
signatories 
* mismanagement of revenues that 
enables a select few to profit 
financially, undermining leadership 
and governance 
* mismanagement of revenues, 
straining relationships with other 
conservation organizations (NGO 
partners) 
Economic structures and 
processes 
* state-sanctioned incentive to better 
protect and manage important 
tourism resource 
* formal recognition—and 
operationalization—of economic 
interdependence among three 
countries 
* equitable, mutually agreeable sharing 
of economic resources 
* shared economic arrangement may 
build confidence and attract additional 
tourism (and non-tourism) investment 
to the region 
* no assurance that all permits and 
associated revenues are reported, and 
therefore shared according to actual 
tourist demand, fuelling distrust  
* lack of legal provisions ensuring 
accountability / transparency for 
transfer of revenues 
* no provisions for following the 
money after it is received, potentially 
leading to misuse of revenues and 
corruption within one or more of the 
countries  
Social empowerment 
 
* promotion of equitable sharing of 
benefits 
* demonstration of commitment to 
regional cooperation 
* contribution to positive 
communication / interaction among 
groups 
* raising the stakes of transboundary 
collaboration– any setbacks or 
tensions will have more serious 
political and economic implications 
* allegations of revenue 
mismanagement may reinforce 
negative feelings / stereotypes of 
other groups 
 
Overall, IGCP’s transboundary work is perceived to have contributed to peacebuilding in the region, 
although challenges remain and there are limitations to this approach. The existing and potential 
economic value of mountain gorillas, along with growing international attention to their struggle for 
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survival in a hostile environment, has certainly provided incentives to adopt a spirit of regional 
cooperation. Yet the sense of responsibility to protect these animals for purely conservation reasons 
and/or to uphold national and regional identities cannot be underestimated. The protected areas 
authorities and staff interviewed for this study all recognize mountain gorillas as a resource 
belonging to all three countries, and responsibility for protecting them is understood as shared and 
interdependent.  
 
The linkages established and fostered through IGCP’s transboundary activities have contributed to 
peacebuilding along both avenues identified above by Conca and Dableko; That is, these activities 
have been used to: (i) create minimum levels of trust, cooperation and transparency among actors, 
thereby helping to offer an improved ‘contractual environment’ for addressing conflictual situations; 
and, looking at broader social dynamics, (ii) deepen trans-societal linkages, regional identities and 
encouraging state institutions to become more accountable. At its simplest, people from different—
and depending on the context, conflicting—sides of national borders have been brought together 
for dialogue and joint action. Forums for discussion and debate have been established. Both formal 
and informal networks of communication and implementation exist, allowing people to build 
relationships, share information and plan together. And more recently, political recognition and 
acceptance of regional collaboration has legitimized these field-level mechanisms of cooperation.  
 
It is worth noting that a number of concerns were raised over IGCP’s role in regional cooperation. 
While all interviewees agreed that IGCP has been instrumental to the coordination of transboundary 
activities (indeed, most of these activities would not have started or continued without IGCP 
support), several questioned the organization’s political neutrality and role as facilitator. Some people 
perceived IGCP as having a strong Rwandan affinity, a view largely attributable to the Executive 
Director’s Rwandan nationality and the relative strength of IGCP’s program in that country. Others 
felt that IGCP had becomes dangerously indispensible to the transboundary process, positioning 
themselves to possibly control the flow of information among regional partners and the overall 
implementation of gorilla conservation activities in the region.28 While these are allegations based on 
politicized perceptions not always founded on fact or reason, IGCP must be made aware of them, as 
they influence behaviours and relationships. As such, IGCP should consider the political and 
practical implications of these perceptions when dealing with partners in the region. 
 
4.4  Summary of lessons learned  
Looking at how IGCP’s work has contributed to both peace and conflict at the community and 
transboundary levels, some general lessons can start to be drawn on how to conflict-sensitize 
conservation. The first point that should be emphasized is that almost all conservation 
interventions—just like other development interventions—can have peace and conflict impacts, 
even at the same time. Because conservation interventions are inherently conflictual or are in many 
ways about resolving conflict (i.e., over resource control and access), the aim is not to render them 
conflict-proof but conflict-sensitive. That is, understanding the peace and conflict impacts of a particular 
activity or program will not necessarily mean that all conflicts will be avoided. Yet understanding the 
                                                 
28 It should be noted that the transboundary process will be managed by a Transboundary Core Secretariat under the 
new Strategic Plan. This arrangement had not yet been initiated at the time of the research, but it may provide some 
distance between IGCP and the transboundary process, thereby tempering perceptions of IGCP’s indispensability. 
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potential or observed peace and conflict impacts of a conservation intervention may serve to avoid 
some conflicts entirely, prevent others from escalating and becoming (even more) destructive, or in 
some cases help to resolve them. , 
 
IGCP’s success in promoting peace at the local level has depended in part on the organization’s 
ability to enlist communities as active partners in their conservation strategies. This participatory 
approach means including communities in park management decisions to increase the transparency 
and trust among them and protected area authorities. The planning of interventions is also crucial: 
deliberately paced projects, consisting of lengthy (though not excessive) consultation and 
sensitization processes with the community, followed by sustainable interventions run by local 
residents (i.e., Nkuringo’s ICEs), were viewed as a success by those involved, whereas rushed 
interventions without careful consideration of conflicting goals, expectations, messages and 
processes failed or exacerbated local conflicts (i.e., MCDO). To address such conflicts requires the 
presence of an unbiased local dispute resolution mechanism to mediate between parties should 
disagreements arise. Finally, strong communication both among and within stakeholder groups is 
essential to aligning interests and reducing information asymmetries.  
 
The factors contributing to peacebuilding at the regional level are similar to those promoting peace 
at the local level. Sustained communication and direct interactions have been essential, as 
opportunities for bringing together different groups to exchange ideas, identify common problems, 
and develop solutions have created a basis for building relationships and trust. These have also 
contributed to the establishment of formal and informal networks of actors who can start to 
depend on each other for support in regular activities (i.e., monitoring) or during times of crisis. This 
‘constructive dependence’ enables different sides to see that tangible benefits can result from 
collaboration, The fact that these links are formal and informal, practical and political, 
environmental and economic, as well as personal and professional has introduced a certain amount 
of flexibility into transboundary cooperation. If/when one avenue for cooperation is temporarily 
blocked (e.g., at the institutional or political level), there may be scope to build on other avenues to 
maintain cooperation and resolve the blockage. Finally, IGCP’s transboundary work allows 
individuals and groups to work together under a shared conservation-related identity, de-
emphasizing divisive identities based on nationality and ethnicity.  
 
Issues that were identified as potentially contributing to conflict—among individuals, institutions 
(i.e., protected areas authorities) and governments—are not too different from factors that 
undermine the success of development projects in general. Lack of participation, poor 
communication, inequitable benefit-sharing, non-transparent processes, as well as 
unsustainable and poorly planned interventions, can fuel distrust and even anger among 
different parties. The absence of mutually-supported conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g., 
joint dispute resolution committees, third party arbitrators, etc.), can lead to the escalation of 
negative feelings and damage relationships. Moreover, prevailing political sensitivities can raise the 
stakes of seemingly innocuous activities such as gorilla monitoring, thereby posing serious 
limitations to transboundary conservation efforts, a reality that in itself can exacerbate tensions and 
frustrations.  
 
Finally, IGCP’s own reputation and (perceived) role has contributed to the peace and conflict 
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impacts of its work. In some cases, its longstanding presence in the region—particularly during the 
height of the regional conflict in the 1990s—has earned IGCP the reputation of being a dependable 
organization with an intimate knowledge of regional dynamics. Its role in helping to build and 
reform institutions such as UWA and ORTPN has won the trust of high-level political actors in 
Uganda and Rwanda, respectively. Moreover, IGCP’s sustained efforts in brokering transboundary 
collaboration at all levels have given it the credibility to take the lead in coordinating these types of 
activities. With this kind of political capital, IGCP has been able to bring together communities, 
conservation professionals and national politicians to work on conserving the region’s mountain 
gorillas and its habitat. Yet for some actors, IGCP is far from being a neutral, apolitical conservation 
actor. Its relatively strong affiliations to Rwanda—both in terms of leadership and program 
activities—have created suspicions among some groups, particularly in DRC. While this may be an 
inevitable result of prevailing regional politics, it is an issue that IGCP should take into account 
when planning or managing interventions in the region.  
5.0 Recommendations: Integrating conflict sensitivity into IGCP’s 
work  
Having recognized some of the factors that contribute to peacebuilding and conflict, a number of 
entry points can be recommended for integrating conflict sensitivity into some of IGCP’s 
conservation interventions. That is, the understanding of the peace and conflict impacts described in 
Section 4 can now be considered in the way IGCP’s interventions are designed, implemented and 
monitored. For example, joint forums for discussion are recognized as having a peace impact in 
regional meetings; is IGCP maximizing opportunities to include them at other levels of its 
transboundary work, or even in other types of conservation work? Similarly, non-transparent 
revenue management schemes can 
have a conflict impact—what 
mechanisms can be put in place to 
minimize this impact? 
Recommendations will first look at 
the opportunities—or entry 
points—for integrating these 
considerations into the project or 
program cycle, and will then 
identify entry points based on the 
types of activities IGCP undertakes 
in its conservation work. Both 
are described below.  
 
Whether integration is done using 
the project or program cycle, or 
through types of activities, the first 
step is conducting an analysis of  
the peace and conflict context. The analysis will depend on the location and scale of the 
intervention—that is, a regional-scale intervention would warrant a regional-level analysis looking at 
Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
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national actors and dynamics, while a community-scale project would require a more localized 
analysis. In each case, the context should be analyzed in terms of the causes/sources of conflict; the 
interests, needs, and capacities of actors; the relationships among identified actors; and prevailing 
conflict dynamics. There are a number of conflict analysis methodologies available, and a summary 
can be found in the Resource Pack at   
http://www.international-alert.org/conflict_sensitivity/resource_pack/chapter_2__266.pdf  
5.1  Integrating conflict sensitivity into the project or program cycle 
Following a peace and conflict analysis, IGCP staff can then apply the results of the analysis to 
different stages in the project or program cycle. These are discussed in detail in the Resource Pack at 
http://www.international-alert.org/conflict_sensitivity/resource_pack/chapter_3__267.pdf, but can 
be summarized as follows: 
 
• Project planning: The stage at which (conservation) problems are defined, causes identified 
and potential solutions developed. Using the conflict analysis, IGCP staff members need to first 
decide how it relates to the objectives of the proposed project. That is, will the intervention 
explicitly address conflict or simply avoid exacerbating it? For example, if corruption is 
identified as a major contributor to conflicts among protected areas authorities, does IGCP 
want to tackle the problem of corruption directly, or simply make sure they are not somehow 
contributing to it? 
  
Once the objectives of the intervention vis-à-vis the conflict situation are clarified, project 
planners can go on to look at how the selection of beneficiaries, project staff, and partners 
might impact the peace and conflict context—i.e., are certain groups profiting more than 
others? If so, can this be justified and properly communicated? Are project staff members from 
the region and do they speak the local languages? If so, does this compromise their perceived 
neutrality or, conversely, does this make them a more trusted player, better able to broker 
relationships? What is the reputation of project partners—are they helping to resolve or 
contribute to the conflict in any way?  
 
In addition to the who question in conflict-sensitive project planning, the where and when must 
also be considered. The question of which geographic region to target for project work is an 
important one for IGCP, since its work has a strong regional profile and seeks to build trust 
and cooperation among three different countries. Perceived preferences for one country may 
create tensions. Even at the local level, the geographic location of an intervention matters. For 
example, benefit-sharing among parks and surrounding communities continues to be highly 
contentious. Not all surrounding communities are likely to profit from a single scheme, making 
the selection of the beneficiary village, parish or district even more sensitive. Again, the 
selection criteria must be defined in a participatory manner, and the results communicated 
widely and transparently.  
 
Finally, the timing and duration of an intervention must be considered in terms of its links to 
the peace and conflict context. Is the timing right—for example, are people ready to support 
and participate in a transboundary dialogue? Moreover is the proposed duration of the project 
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appropriate given the context?  
 
Apart from looking at the what, who, where and when questions, IGCP staff should also build 
in contingency plans to respond to a shifting peace and conflict context, as well as an 
appropriate exit strategy, to help manage expectations throughout the course of the intervention 
and avoid undermining the sustainability of project or program results.  
 
• Project implementation: The stage at which activities are undertaken to achieve defined 
objectives. Conflict-sensitive implementation involves managing, monitoring and adjusting 
project activities according to an understanding of the peace and conflict context.  
 
Setting up the operational aspects of a project, from opening an office, to negotiating contracts, 
or sourcing materials, or establishing administrative and financial structures, and accessing sites, 
must all be done with an awareness of how they are linked to the peace and conflict context. 
Being sure that activities are coordinated with other organzations, preventing duplication and 
competition, is also important. Then monitoring developments in line with the peace and 
conflict context (see below) should be undertaken to allow for adjustments to be made as 
needed. 
 
• Project monitoring and evaluation: The stage at which an interventions outputs and impacts 
are assessed against objectives, providing a basis for adjusting implementation activities or 
drawing lessons for future interventions. Making sure the monitoring and evaluation is timed 
appropriately (i.e., relative to political developments or seasonal shifts, both of which may have 
peace and conflict implications) is one way to make this stage of programming conflict-
sensitive. Otherwise, this stage involves assessing changes in the context, the project both in 
terms of its intended and actual implementation, and the interaction between the project and 
the context.  
 
Indicators will need to be developed for monitoring and evaluation. These can be both 
objective and perception-based indicators and should be developed at the outset of an 
intervention, and in a participatory manner involving project staff, park authorities, community 
members and any other stakeholders. Table 8 provides a sample of peace and conflict indicators 
for IGCP’s local conservation interventions, as well as its transboundary work: 
 
Table  8:  Sample  objective  and  perception‐based  indicators  for  assessing  the  peace  and  conflict  impacts  of 
IGCP’s conservation work in the Virunga‐Bwindi region 
 
IGCP Category of Activity Objective Indicators Perception-based Indicators
Indicators of communication, 
collaboration, participation and 
responsiveness 
Indicators of feelings, interests, 
hopes, fears 
 
Local conservation 
interventions 
 
Including:  
? Establishment of buffer 
 
* number of land purchases taken to 
adjudication  
* establishment of a park-people 
dispute resolution mechanism (e.g., 
identification of a third party 
* fairness of land purchase price 
* appropriate and/or acceptable 
management of land purchase 
process 
* effectiveness of buffer zone in 
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IGCP Category of Activity Objective Indicators Perception-based Indicators
Indicators of communication, 
collaboration, participation and 
responsiveness 
Indicators of feelings, interests, 
hopes, fears 
zone 
? Managing human-wildlife 
conflicts 
 
 
 
 
 
arbitrator for conservation-related 
conflicts) 
* amount of time gorillas spend on 
community land 
* approximate amount of time 
HUGO volunteers spend managing 
human-wildlife conflicts 
* average annual crop loss due to 
animal incursions 
* number of meetings held among 
intervention-related stakeholders 
* type and rate of disease 
transmission between humans and 
gorillas  
 
reducing human-wildlife conflict
* appropriate management of the 
buffer zone  
* tensions among members within a 
village, among parishes, among 
communities and park staff over 
conservation costs and benefits  
* fairness and impartiality of local 
judicial system in resolving 
conservation-related disputes  
* honesty and openness of 
institutions operating on 
communities’ behalf  
 
 
 
Transboundary cooperation 
 
Including:  
? Regional surveillance  
? Regional meetings 
? Trilateral agreements 
 
* number/frequency of requests for 
patrols 
* number/frequency of patrols 
undertaken 
* availability and type of 
communications equipment on 
patrols 
* establishment and frequency of 
review of transboundary surveillance 
plan  
* number/frequency of regional 
meetings  
* number of representatives from 
each country participating in regional 
meetings 
* number of times communication is 
initiated among regional partners (at 
different levels)  
* identification and review of 
national conservation policies 
* establishment and updating of 
shared conservation database for 
regional monitoring (of gorillas, 
habitat change, illegal activities) 
* production of surveillance maps 
and reports for regional monitoring  
* establishment of regional 
conservation dispute resolution 
mechanism 
* number/frequency of disputes 
reported to the regional conservation 
dispute resolution mechanism  
 
 
* ranger impressions of value and 
utility of patrols  
* ranger impressions of cross-border 
colleagues, in terms of capacity, 
commitment, efficacy 
* ranger impressions of adequacy of 
communication—in terms of 
logistics and willingness—with cross-
border colleagues  
* PA staff impression of 
transboundary surveillance plan 
* participant impressions of the 
value/utility of regional meetings for 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
* openness, inclusion and fairness 
demonstrated at regional meetings 
* progress in reconciling or 
harmonizing national conservation 
policies 
* usefulness of database and 
surveillance maps 
* effectiveness of regional 
conservation dispute resolution 
mechanism  
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5.2  Integrating conflict sensitivity into different types of conservation 
interventions  
Apart from integrating conflict sensitivity into IGCP’s project and programming cycle, other entry-
points for integration can be identified based on the type and scale of conservation intervention. 
Below is a preliminary list of suggestions, which should be built upon depending on IGCP’s own 
capacities and interests in the Virunga-Bwindi region. 
 
• IGCP Strategic Plan: While this may still be under development or review by the IGCP board 
and senior management, the strategic plan presents an opportunity to institutionalize the 
concept of conflict sensitivity. By recognizing that their work may have conflict and 
peacebuilding impacts in a region already beset by conflict, and acknowledging that allowances 
must be made to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts, IGCP would 
formalize its commitment to the principles of peacebuilding. A closer look at the Strategic Plan 
would be needed to identify specific areas where conflict sensitivity could be incorporated.  
 
• Conservation management planning: This could be at a local level, such as the Nkuringo 
Buffer Zone Management Plan, at the park-level, such as the Virunga NP General Management 
Plan, or at the regional-level, for the proposed transboundary protected area management plan. 
The process for developing these plans, as well as the resulting documents or plans themselves, 
should be conflict-sensitized. This can mean incorporating general peacebuilding principles 
(e.g., transparency, collaboration, and participation), addressing conflict directly (e.g., including 
emergency planning measures, conflict resolution structures), or designing policies that at least 
avoid creating or exacerbating conflict.  
 
• Business/enterprise planning: As IGCP looks to expand its enterprise programming in the 
region, program staff may want to better understand how the process of planning for and 
implementing these types of activities may contribute to peace and/or conflict. Do the 
enterprises address some of the root causes of tension or conflict in the area? How are 
beneficiaries selected? What are the management structures how is power distributed? How are 
profits reported and managed? Are there structures and policies in place to resolve disputes? 
These are some of the questions that might be asked when developing a small business plan.  
 
• Ten-year Transboundary Strategic Plan: While this document has already been developed 
and signed, it should be regularly reviewed and updated as needed. Indeed, flexibility is one of 
the key principles of conflict sensitivity. For example, the current plan does not make mention 
of how to handle disputes or conflict—this is something that might be addressed in the next 
iteration of the Plan.  
 
• Draft principles for conflict-sensitive conservation in the Virunga-Bwindi region: While 
this type of initiative has not yet been developed by IGCP—or any other conservation 
organization operating in the Virunga-Bwindi region—it presents an opportunity for 
formalizing a commitment to conflict sensitivity by the conservation actors in the region. This 
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could be a set of principles for international conservation NGOs operating in the region, who 
work with the same local and national conservation actors, confront similar challenges, and 
pursue similar objectives. It could cover issues such as communication with each other and 
partners, contingency planning, project identification and selection criteria, as well as developing 
PCIA indicators for monitoring and evaluating conflict-sensitive conservation in the region. 
The process for developing these principles could provide an additional forum for improved 
coordination among conservation organizations.  
 
Other entry points for conflict sensitivity in IGCP’s work could include ranger-based monitoring 
policies, staff rules, and fundraising strategies.  
 
6.0 Lessons Learned on Conducting PCIA Process 
 
Photo courtesy of IGCP. 
 
In addition to better understanding the links between IGCP’s work and the peace and conflict 
dynamics in the Virunga-Bwindi region, study yielded a number of important lessons about the 
PCIA and conflict sensitivity process. These lessons can be brought to bear in future assessments, 
streamlining the process and leading to useful recommendations.  
 
a) Find an institutional PCIA champion: Due to the sensitive nature of some of the issues 
discussed during consultations, and the potential for drawing attention to internal organizational 
problems or weaknesses, the PCIA process needs a champion—i.e., somebody who buys-in to 
the principles of conflict sensitivity and is willing to promote them within (and outside) the 
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organization. The person(s) must be frank about the challenges and opportunities of working in 
a conflict zone, and not threatened by the process and results of a PCIA. Indeed, they would 
recognize PCIA as an opportunity to understand the impact of their organization’s work 
through a different analytical lens. Ideally, this champion would be somebody in senior 
management who could mobilize support at other levels within the organization and ensure 
results will be reviewed and recommendations implemented.  
 
b) Importance of language: An obvious point, but important nonetheless—making sure that the 
people consulted during the PCIA process are able to communicate in a language in which they 
feel comfortable expressing themselves. This is especially important because of the relative 
sensitivity of the issues discussed—personal interests, feelings, impressions, opinions, etc. For 
this study, English was sufficient for consulting most IGCP staff in Uganda, Kenya and Kigali, 
but French was the preferred language in Ruhengeri and most of DRC. Thus, having a research 
team with at least one French speaker was necessary. When project team members consulted 
with local communities, local languages such as Swahili and Kinyarwandan were used, meaning 
the research team had to rely on translation services from project partners. Ideally, the research 
team would have included members who spoke local languages. 
 
c) Define and explain your terms: As expected, the word ‘conflict’ is laden with different social 
and political understandings. Any process that seeks to understand peoples’ impressions of it 
must be accompanied by a clear explanation of what is meant by ‘conflict’. For example, some 
stakeholders understood ‘conflict’ to be related only to violence and open war. Others associated 
it only with traditional park-people tensions, while others felt that problems among or within 
levels of government and agencies represented conflict. All of these were relevant to this study, 
which in some cases created confusion. Thus, workshops and consultations required an 
explanation of the definition of conflict, which types of conflict were relevant to the study, and 
some basic characteristics that tied all of these conflicts together. The same clarity was needed in 
discussing ‘peace’ and/or ‘peacebuilding,’ as many felt it was a condition or process 
characterized by the absence of war brokered at the state level. Others recognized that peace or 
peacebuilding was also about informal, local-level mechanisms that built relationships and trust. 
Again, both interpretations were relevant to this study, which needed to be explained.  
 
d) Beware of other similar initiatives: Conservation organizations in many parts of Africa—
particularly in the Great Lakes regions—are being inundated with external experts and money 
for conflict-related work. Research and training in issues such as ‘conflict management’, ‘conflict 
resolution’, ‘conflict mapping’, ‘conflict analysis’ and ‘conflict sensitivity’ are certainly needed in 
the Virunga-Bwindi region, but coordination is essential. At the very least, researchers and 
consultants must be aware of other consultants and organizations that are working in their 
research area so they can minimize the risk of local research and training fatigue. Moreover, 
there is also the risk of sending contradictory messages and approaches to local partners, which 
can only confuse and ultimately undermine project results. The risk of creating conflicts through 
lack of coordination cannot be underestimated! Researchers, consultants and local partner 
organizations must therefore work together to make sure information is shared and synergies 
explored.  
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e) Maximize opportunities for informal consultations: The PCIA process is ideally a 
combination of formal and informal interactions. Workshops can be important for bringing 
people together to achieve a joint understanding of PCIA-related concepts, and exchange ideas, 
build relationships. Workshops can also be used as opportunities for training, which can leave 
participants feeling that they have gained (and not only given) something to the process. Semi-
structured consultations in communities can do the same. Moreover, the ‘formal’ nature of 
workshops and consultations can lend legitimacy to the process, sending the signal that certain 
institutions take the issues discussed quite seriously. 
 
Nonetheless, workshops and consultations are not sufficient for a robust PCIA process. 
Research Team members took advantage of opportunities to have informal conversations 
outside of offices and capitals, where people felt more comfortable discussing sensitive issues. It 
was this anecdotal information that generally completed or clarified the ideas discussed in 
workshops, and helped Research Team members to better understand the complex links among 
conservation, peace and conflict.  
 
f) Allow for steady, ongoing contact with PCIA partners: Because the PCIA process was led 
by consultants and an organization based outside of the region, direct interactions with 
stakeholders in the region were irregular. Fortunately, the project budget allowed for regular field 
visits and Research Team members took advantage of additional opportunities to interact with 
project stakeholders during other, non-IGCP related trips to the region. However, even with this 
relatively frequent interaction, these visits did not make up for the benefits of having a Research 
Team based in the region.  
 
There were a number of challenges and risks that resulted from not having this sustained 
presence in the region. Sporadic visits by external actors, no matter how frequent, may have sent 
the message that PCIA is an externally-driven, top-down process. Members of the field staff are 
already over-burdened, and PCIA research visits may have been construed as an additional 
burden. Finally, personnel changes in field staff weakened the continuity in the field research and 
increased the chances for miscommunication—a bigger risk in the absence of an institutional 
PCIA champion. Thus, in a case where the PCIA Research Team is based outside of the region 
and local institutional support for the PCIA process is lacking, efforts should be made to engage 
a locally-based consultant to act as a focal point for the project, somebody who can maintain 
regular contact with project staff and build this institutional support, monitor the dynamic peace 
and conflict context, and continue gathering relevant information.  
 
g) Be aware of the working approach / culture of the organization: In order to better ensure 
institutional participation in the PCIA process and uptake of PCIA results, researchers must be 
aware of the organization’s culture and modus operandi. This means understanding its management 
structure (hierarchical, or horizontal?), its project development and management processes 
(preferred funders? Emphasis on indicators?), the type of work it focuses on (management 
plans? Biological monitoring? Community-based conservation?), and its staff development 
policies (training opportunities?) Understanding these issues will also help to clarify the 
expectations around a PCIA process—does the organization hope that the PCIA process will 
demonstrate due diligence to their funders, or do they want to re-think programming priorities? 
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Knowing this will enable people to tailor the PCIA process and make it most useful to the 
organization in question.  
 
h) Be sensitive to the political realities that may challenge or limit the PCIA process: Finally, 
people undertaking PCIA processes must accept that PCIA processes can be difficult, 
frustrating, and politicized. Conflict zones are dynamic and volatile, so researchers must be 
aware of changes in the context at all times so that their analysis is better embedded. They also 
need to be aware of the different forums or circumstances in which people feel comfortable 
talking about conflict or peace, and ensure that stakeholders do not feel they are putting 
themselves in a compromising position by participating in the PCIA process. For example, do 
members of the project staff feel insecure discussing issues that potentially criticize their 
organization? Finally, some participants in a PCIA process may see it as an opportunity to air 
grievances, advance personal agendas. While this may be in and of itself illustrative of the peace 
and conflict impacts of an organization’s work, PCIA researchers should be aware of these 
underlying interests and consider them within the broader context of the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
